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THE ILLINOIS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY: A NEW BLUEPRINT
FOR DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT
George Vernon *
The Illinois Supreme Court recently adopted an official Code of
Professional Responsibility that governs the conduct of all Illinois
attorneys. In this Article, Mr. Vernon highlights the fundamental
themes interspersed throughout the Code, including confidentiality
between attorneys and clients, the methods of attracting clients,
professional responsibility regarding fees and other monetary is-
sues, and conflicts of interest. Mr. Vernon offers an explanation
and interpretation of problematic provisions of the Illinois Code
and discusses certain significant departures from the American Bar
Association's Model Code of Professional Responsibility. In conclu-
sion, Mr. Vernon suggests that a working knowledge of the Code is
essential to avoid difficult issues of professional ethics and attorney
discipline.
The Illinois Supreme Court formally adopted the Illinois Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility on June 3, 1980. It thereby established the first official
guidelines for the professional conduct of Illinois attorneys.' The Code's
scope is broad. While many of its rules are straightforward, others contain
complexities that are incapable of definitive resolution. This Article discusses
some of the major themes which cut across the various rules of the new
Illinois Code, and provides an overview of its miscellaneous provisions.'
ADVENT OF THE CODE
Administration and enforcement of lawyer discipline is the responsibility
of the Illinois Supreme Court's Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Com-
mission.3 Before the Commission's creation in 1973, special committees of
*Attorney, Karon, Morrison & Savikas, Ltd., Chicago, Ill.; B.A. Harvard University; J.D.,
University of Chicago. Mr. Vernon was the reporter for the Committee on Professional Responsi-
bility, which prepared and submitted proposed drafts of the new code to the Illinois Supreme
Court.
1. See ILLINOIS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ILL. SuP. CT. R. 771, ARTicLE VII,
1980 I11. Legis. Serv. 340-83 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 771)
[hereinafter cited as ILL. CODE]. The Code officially went into effect on July 1, 1980. See also
note 4 and accompanying text infra.
2. For another general source, see Model Rules of Professional Conduct currently being
prepared by the ABA's Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, the group ap-
pointed to rewrite the ABA Model Code. The Commission's Proposed Final Draft, dated May
30, 1981, contains thoughtful commentary and appropriate references on each area addressed by
the Rules. The present timetable calls for the Commission's Proposed Final Draft to be consid-
ered by the ABA's House of Delegates at its 1982 midyear meeting. See also AMERICAN BAR
FOUNDATION, ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1979).
3. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 751 (codified at ILL. REv. STAT. ch. li0A, § 751 (1979)).
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the Illinois State and Chicago Bar Associations, acting under the auspices of
the supreme court, were responsible for investigating, prosecuting, and hear-
ing disciplinary complaints brought against Illinois lawyers.
4
When the Disciplinary Commission was established, the Administrator of
the Commission was given the power to "investigate conduct of attorneys
which tends to defeat the administration of justice or to bring the courts or
the legal profession into disrepute." 5 While better than no rule, this vague
standard provided minimal guidance to lawyers in shaping their professional
conduct. Both before and after establishing the standard, the court unoffi-
cially relied upon canons of ethics and disciplinary rules adopted by the
organized bar in its disciplinary opinions." The court emphasized that these
canons and rules, while "not binding obligations, nor enforceable by the
courts as such, . . . constitute a safe guide for professional conduct and an
attorney may be disciplined for not observing them."
17
Materials were available for lawyers seeking the "safe guide" described by
the court in its disciplinary opinions. In the late 1960s, the American Bar
Association codified the old canons of ethics into a Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility." In 1970, the Chicago Bar Association and the Illinois
State Bar Association passed their own versions of the Model Code, 9 each
version differing in some material respects from the ABA Model Code. 10
4. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, § 751 (1971) (amended 1973).
5. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 752(a) (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 752(a) (1979)).
6. Although the principal guideline used by the states has been the ABA MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1980), the first code of profes-
sional ethics was drafted and adopted by the Alabama State Bar Association in 1887. H.
DRINKEn, LEGAL ETHICS 23 (1953) [hereinafter cited as DRINKER]. In 1908, the American Bar
Association formulated the Canons of Professional Ethics, based largely on the Alabama Code.
The Canons were quickly adopted by a majority of states with little or no change. From 1908
until'1969, the original 32 Canons were amended and new Canons added on a piecemeal basis.
7. In re Krasner, 32 Ill. 2d 121, 129, 204 N.E.2d 10, 14 (1965) (emphasis added). Accord,
In re Kutner, 78 Ill. 2d 157, 164, 399 N.E.2d 963, 965 (1979); In re Taylor, 66 I11. 2d 567, 571,
363 N.E.2d 845, 847 (1977); People v. McCallum, 341 111.578, 590, 173 N.E.2d 827, 831 (1930).
8. ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980) [hereinafter cited as ABA
MODEL CODE]. The ABA Model Code differs from the Canons both in substance and in form. For
a discussion of the evolution of the Canons and the adoption of the ABA Model Code, see Preface
to ABA MODEL CODE, supra, at i. The ABA Model Code consists of three separate, but interre-
lated parts: Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules. The Canons, which bear
no resemblance to the old Canons of Professional Ethics, state axiomatic norms that express in
general terms standards of professional conduct. The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in
nature and indicate the objectives toward which an attorney should strive. The Disciplinary
Rules, however, are mandatory and an attorney may be disciplined for their violation. See
Preamble and Preliminary Statement to ABA MODEL CODE, supra, at 1.
9. See ILL. STATE BAR Ass'N, ILLINOIS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (rev. ed.
1977); CHICAGO BAR Ass'N, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1970).
10. For the significant differences between the Code as adopted by the Illinois State Bar
Association, the American Bar Association, and the Chicago Bar Association, see ILLINOIS INST.
FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDuc., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY-ANNOTATED (ILLINOIS)
(1978).
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Ultimately, only the Illinois Supreme Court had the authority to reconcile
the conflicting provisions of the different codes. In 1978 Illinois was one of
only three states in which the highest court had not yet adopted a compre-
hensive set of disciplinary rules.'
On May 12, 1978, the supreme court appointed a Committee on Profes-
sional Responsibility to make recommendations concerning the adoption of
comprehensive rules. 12 The Committee prepared a draft code, which was
submitted to the court in December, 1978 and distributed for comment to
bar associations and other interested parties. The court made revisions in the
Committee's first draft and returned it to the Committee for additional
study. Final decisions on content were made by the supreme court, which,
on June 3, 1980, officially adopted the Illinois Code of Professional Responsi-
bility.
The Committee used the Disciplinary Rules of the ABA Model Code as its
principal guide and followed that code in drafting the majority of the Illinois
Rules. A commentary, prepared by the Committee, accompanies the Illinois
Code. The commentary not only explains departures from the ABA Model
Code, but also provides unofficial interpretive guidance on the meaning and
application of various Illinois Code provisions.
MAJOR THEMES IN THE ILLINOIS CODE
This Article concentrates on four fundamental themes interspersed
throughout the various rules in the Illinois Code. The first theme is the
confidential relationship existing between the attorney and any client, and
the limitations imposed on that confidentiality. Next, the general area of
attracting clients is discussed, with special emphasis on the departures from
the ABA Model Code mandated by the United States Supreme Court's le-
gitimization of professional advertising and solicitation. Third, the Article
reviews some monetary problems of professional responsibility, including
fees, litigation costs, and the segregation of client funds. Fourth, situations
involving conflicts of interest are evaluated, with special attention given to
activities of former government lawyers. Finally, miscellaneous provisions of
the Illinois Code unrelated to its major themes are briefly addressed.
Client Confidences and the Lawyer's
Duty to Disclose Information
The familiar rule that an attorney may not disclose the confidences and
secrets of past or present clients can present intractable ethical dilemmas. A
lawyer representing a client with interests adverse to a present or former
11. Interview with Carl H. Rolewick, Esq., Administrator, Attorney Registration and Disci-
plinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Illinois, in Chicago, Illinois (October 24, 1980)
[hereinafter cited as Rolewick Interview].
12. See note 1 and accompanying text supra.
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client may face strong temptation to reveal confidential information. Simi-
larly, a lawyer who discovers information-such as the client's intent to
commit a crime or to obstruct a judicial proceeding-can be torn between
responsibilities to the client and to the system of administration of justice.
The Illinois Code addresses the problem of preserving client confidences in
two ways. First, it limits the extent to which a lawyer may represent a client
with interests adverse to those of a present or former client. 3 Second, it
permits or requires lawyers in some circumstances to disclose information in
their possession. 14 The source of the information to be disclosed may be an
important factor in applying the Code's rules, because substantially greater
protection is afforded to information obtained from confidential client com-
munications. 15
As a point of departure, the Code prohibits lawyers from disclosing the
"confidences or secrets" of their clients, or from using such confidences or
secrets to the disadvantage of the client or to the advantage of the lawyer or
some third person.' A "confidence" is defined by the Code as information
protected by the attorney-client privilege. 7 A "secret" is a far broader
concept, encompassing "other information gained in the professional rela-
tionship that the client has requested to be held inviolate or the disclosure of
which would be embarrassing to or would likely be detrimental to the
client."18
The Code authorizes exceptions to the general rule of confidentiality in
certain circumstances. For example, disclosure of confidences or secrets may
be made at the discretion of the lawyer with the informed consent of the
client;' 9 when necessary to establish or collect the lawyer's fee or defend the
1
13. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 5-105. See notes 122-162 and accompanying text infra.
14. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rules 4-104(c) and (d) provide for certain situations in which
disclosure is discretionary. See notes 19-21 and accompanying text infra. Under Rules 4-101(c),
7-102(a)(3), 7-103(b), 7-106(b)(1), and 7-108(g) of the Illinois Code disclosure is mandatory. See
notes 22-26 and accompanying text infra.
15. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 4-104 (Committee Commentary). Privileged information
is not, however, completely immune from the disclosure provisions of the Code. Moreover, some
of the limitations on the attorney-client privilege imposed by the law of evidence can have
significant application to the kinds of situations addressed by the Code. See notes 33-37 and
accompanying text infra. See generally UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 502 (1974); FED. R. EVID.
501.
16. Rule 4-101(b) of the Illinois Code provides:
Except when permitted under Rules 4-101(c) and (d) a lawyer shall not knowingly,
during or after termination of the professional relationship to his client,
(1) reveal a confidence or secret of his client;
(2) use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client;
(3) use a confidence or secret of his client to the advantage of himself or of a third
person, unless the client consents after full disclosure.
ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 4-101.
17. Id. Rule 4-101(a).
18. Id.
19. Id. Rule 4-101(d)(1). "A lawyer may reveal (1) confidences or secrets with the consent of
the client or clients, but only after a full disclosure to them; . . . " Id. See Shufeldt v. Barker, 56
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lawyer against an accusation of wrongful conluct;20 and when permitted or
required by the Code, a law, or a court order.
21
The Illinois Code requires disclosure by lawyers in a number of circum-
stances without regard to whether the information was obtained by a privi-
leged client communication. The special requirements in criminal discovery
imposed on prosecutors by Brady v. Maryland2 2 and related cases, are incor-
porated into the Code in Rule 7-103(b) .23 Rule 7-108(g) obliges the lawyer
to reveal to a court information regarding improper conduct by a juror or
venireman.24
I11. 299 (1870) (one member of the client firm cannot release attorney from his obligation of
secrecy). See generally Karris v. Water Tower Trust & Sav. Bank, 72 Ill. App. 3d 339, 389
N.E.2d 1359 (1st Dist. 1979) (attorney stands in fiduciary relationship with his corporate client);
Ruggiero v. Attore, 51 111. App. 3d 139, 366 N.E.2d 470 (1st Dist. 1977) (law watches with
particular care, and subjects to closest scrutiny, all transactions between attorney and his or her
client during, or growing out of their relationship); Sherman v. Klopfer, 32 111. App. 3d 519, 336
N.E.2d 219 (1st Dist. 1975) (attorney breaches fiduciary obligation by reporting client to
Internal Revenue Service); People v. Smith, 10 Ill. App. 3d 61, 293 N.E.2d 465 (3d Dist. 1973)
(attorney may not waive legal rights guaranteed to client by law if contrary to client's "wish" or
direction).
20. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 4-101(d)(4). See Funk v. Mohr, 185 Ill. 395, 57 N.E. 2
(1900) (disclosure of confidential discussions regarding construction of provisions of contract
negotiated between attorney and client is permitted in a trial where attorney is defending against
misconduct allegation); Sokol v. Mortimer 81111. App. 2d 55, 225 N.E.2d 496 (1st Dist. 1967) (to
prohibit disclosure by attorney would allow attorney to be charged with conduct fatal to his
cause of action, yet render him incompetent to answer in response to the attack upon his
professional integrity). See generally C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 91, at 191 (2d
ed. E. Cleary 1972) ("when client and attorney become embroiled in a controversy between
themselves, as in an action by the attorney for compensation or by the client for damages for the
attorney's negligence, the seal is removed from the attorney's lips"); cf. UNIFORM RULES OF
EVIDENCE 502(d)(3) (1974) ("there is no privilege . . . [a]s to a communication relevant to an
issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to his client or by the client to his lawyer").
21. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 4-101(d)(2). CHICAGO BAR ASS'N COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, OPINIONS, No. 71-72-11 (attorney may testify before a grand jury respecting
communications between himself and his client where he has been ordered to do so by a court
order). See also ILL. STATE BAR ASS'N, OPINIONS, Nos. 180 (May 19, 1960) & 471 (Oct. 14, 1974).
Cf. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 502(d) (1974) (no attorney-client privilege exists in situations
involving furtherance of a crime, breach of duty by either attorney or client, documents attested
by the attorney, joint clients, or where parties claim through the same deceased client of the
attorney).
22. 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutor's failure to honor defendant's request for material evi-
dence favorable to defendant's position constitutes violation of due process).
23. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 7-103(b) provides: "A public prosecutor or other govern-
ment lawyer in criminal litigation shall make timely disclosure to counsel for the defendant, ...
of the existence of evidence, . . . that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the
degree of the offense."
24. Id. Rule 7-108(g) provides: "A lawyer shall reveal promptly to the court improper
conduct by a venireman or a juror, or by another toward a venireman or a juror or a member of
his family, of which the lawyer has knowledge." Accord, In re Kozlov, 156 N.J. Super. 316, 383
A.2d 1158 (1978) (attorney held in contempt for failing to reveal identity of client who informed
attorney that a juror in a criminal case was intent on "getting even"; attorney-client privilege
inapplicable); In re R, 276 Or. 365, 368, 554 P.2d 522, 524 (1976) (juror participating in
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The foregoing instances of mandatory disclosure obligations track similar
provisions in the ABA Model Code.2" The Illinois Code's Rule 4-101(c)
incorporates a significant departure from familiar tradition and from the
ABA Model Code. This rule directs a lawyer to disclose information neces-
sary to prevent the client from committing an act that would result in death
or serious bodily harm.26  The rule applies regardless of whether the infor-
mation would otherwise be privileged from disclosure due to the attorney-
client relationship, and is not expressly limited to criminal acts. Hence, the
rule could be interpreted to require disclosure of prospective violations of
civil or administrative standards that would result in death or serious bodily
harm. The "serious bodily harm" provision does not appear in the present
ABA Model Code, 27 but was taken from the Discussion Draft of the proposed
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.2 8 The justification for the provision,
as discussed in the Commentary to the Illinois Code, is that when homicide
or serious bodily injury is threatened, the interests of society and potential
personal injury case was picked up while hitchhiking by the plaintiff in the same case). The
Oregon court held that whenever an attorney is in doubt about his obligation to inform court of
juror misconduct, this doubt should be resolved in favor of disclosure.
25. See also ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 7-102(a)(3). The Rule provides: "In his representa-
tion of a client, a lawyer shall not . . . conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is
required by law to reveal." Id. See, e.g., People v. Beattie, 137 I11. 553, 574, 27 N.E. 1096, 1103
(1891) (attorney's loyalty to his client tempered by duties as "ministers of justice"); In re Estate of
Minsky, 59 Ill. App. 3d 974, 376 N.E.2d 647 (1st Dist. 1978) (as attorney and officer of court,
attorney is under duty to inform court of any suspicion of fraud by client's executor); Semmens v.
Semmens, 53 I11. App. 3d 160, 368 N.E.2d 732 (4th Dist. 1977) (failure to disclose amendment to
divorce settlement agreement is improper conduct by attorney, as it interferes with the court's
ability to determine rights of parties). An additional effect of the Rule is to codify normal
discovery obligations imposed by statute or court rule. See also note 168 infra.
26. Rule 4-101(c) of the Illinois Code provides: "A lawyer shall disclose information about a
client to the extent it appears necessary to prevent the client from committing an act that would
result in death or serious bodily harm to another person, and to the extent required by law or the
rules of professional conduct." ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 4-101(c).
27. The ABA Model Code permits, but does not require an attorney to reveal "[t]he intention
of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime." ABA MODEL
CODE, supra note 8, DR 4-101(c)(3). However, the ABA Model Code does not make special
provision for acts involving "serious bodily harm," as the Illinois Code does.
28. ABA COMM. ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (January 30, 1980 Discussion Draft). The ABA Draft suggested that
when homicide or serious bodily injury is threatened, the loss to the potential victim is such that
the lawyer is obligated to disclose privileged communications or information in order to prevent
the harm. Id. The ABA Commission's Proposed Final Draft retreated from this position and
made the disclosure discretionary rather than mandatory. See id. Rule 1.6(b) (May 30, 1981)
(Proposed Final Draft). See also ABA STANDING COMM. ON ASS'N STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-3.7(d) (2d ed. 1980), which states:
A lawyer may reveal the expressed intention of a client to commit crime and . . .
must do so if the contemplated crime is one which would seriously endanger the life
or safety of any person . . . and the lawyer believes such action on his or her part is
necessary to prevent it.
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victims outweigh the interests that justify the general rule in favor of the
preservation of client confidences. 29
A number of rules provide for mandatory disclosure of information pos-
sessed by the lawyer except when the information is received in a privileged
communication. Rule 1-103(a), in conjunction with Rule 1-102, imposes an
affirmative obligation to report to an appropriate tribunal or investigative
authority any unprivileged knowledge that another lawyer has engaged in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, or in illegal
conduct involving moral turpitude. 30  A related provision, Rule 1-103(b),
makes clear that lawyers have no special right to resist a proper request by an
investigative tribunal to disclose unprivileged knowledge regarding the mis-
conduct of a lawyer or judge. 31 Finally, Rule 7-102(b) of the Illinois Code
tracks the ABA Model Code by mandating that a lawyer should call upon his
or her client to rectify any fraud perpetrated by the client in the course of the
representation. If the client refuses, both the Illinois and ABA Codes require
the lawyer to disclose the fraud unless the lawyer's information is "protected
as a privileged communication. '" 32
Difficult ethical problems revolve around this exception which authorizes
an attorney's refusal to disclose information received as a result of a "privi-
leged communication." The scope of the exception is not necessarily defined
by the substantive law of evidence relating to the attorney-client privilege.
The ABA's Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility has inter-
preted it far more broadly, encompassing not only communications covered
by the evidentiary privilege, but any communication disclosing "confidences
or secrets" as defined by Rule 4-101. 3 3 The ABA approach, however, would
render virtually any information received from the client immune from
disclosure. A number of courts have refused to follow the ABA approach
when the information is related to perjured testimony. 34
29. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Canon 4 (Committee Commentary).
30. Id. Rule 1-103(a). The scope of the Illinois Code obligation is substantially narrower
than that contained in the ABA Model Code, whose DR 1-103(A) requires the disclosure of
unprivileged knowledge regarding the violation by another lawyer of any Disciplinary Rule.
31. Rule 1-103(b) of the Illinois Code states: "A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge
...concerning another lawyer or judge shall reveal [that knowledge] fully." Id. Rule 1-103(b).
32. Rule 7-102(b)(1) of the Illinois Code provides:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that (1) his client has, ...
perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to
rectify the same, and if his client refuses. . . he shall reveal the fraud to the affected
person or tribunal, except when the information is protected as a privileged com-
munication.
ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 7-102(b)(1). See note 34 and accompanying text infra.
33. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 341 (September 30, 1975).
34. When the discovered information involves a fraud by an individual other than the client,
the tribunal shall be promptly notified. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 7-102(b)(2). For a
discussion of the responsibility of an attorney to disclose the perjured testimony of a client, see
Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 So. Cal. L. Rev. 809, 864-66 (1977). See, e.g., In re Estate of
Minsky, 59 Ill. App. 3d 974, 376 N.E.2d 647 (1st Dist. 1978) (as attorney and officer of the
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If the ABA approach creates a general rule tilted too far toward nondisclo-
sure, a rule based on the scope of the evidentiary privilege runs the opposite
risk. It is well established that the evidentiary privilege does not extend to
communications when the client's purpose is the furtherance of a continuing
or future crime or fraud.35 The situations addressed by Rule 7-102 would
normally involve communications related to a fraud with continuing conse-
quences, for which the attorney-client privilege provides no shield from
disclosure.
Further complicating the problem is the effort by federal government
agencies, principally the Securities and Exchange Commission, to enlist
lawyers' services as watchdogs over their regulated clients. 3  These efforts
are not limited to conduct in adjudicatory proceedings, and constitute a
considerable extension of the more traditional applications of Rule 7-102(b).
The limits of this proposed extension remain undefined. It is clear, however-,
that the SEC intends to press its position by attempting to regulate the
lawyers who will practice before it. 3 7  No general answer to the foregoing
dilemma is likely to emerge soon. Rather, courts will continue to give specific
court, attorney for executor was under a duty to inform court of any suspicion of fraud by
client/executor); In re Estate of Gullett, 92 I11. App. 2d 405, 234 N.E.2d 551 (4th Dist. 1968)
(attorney under a duty to inform the court of any wrongdoing apparent to him on the part of his
client); In re Estate of Glenos, 50 Ill. App. 2d 89, 200 N.E.2d 65 (1st Dist. 1964) (attorney has a
duty to inform the court of his suspicion of fraud on the part of his client). But see In re Malloy,
248 N.W.2d 43 (N.D. 1976) (when client commits perjury, as surprise to his counsel, attorney
should urge client to disclose truth, and, if client refuses to do so, withdraw from the case, but
attorney need not disclose the fraud to the court).
Less ambiguous than the duty to disclose perjured testimony is the duty to withdraw from the
representation when the client insists on its use. According to Rule 7-102(a)(4) of the Illinois
Code, "In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not ... (4) knowingly use perjured
testimony or false evidence." ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 7-102(a)(4). See, e.g., In re A, 276
Or. 225, 554 P.2d 479 (1976) (if a client refuses to correct a perjury, the attorney should
withdraw from the case); In re Millers, 248 N.W.2d 43 (N.D. 1976) (client's refusal to correct
perjury should lead to attorney's withdrawal).
35. See United States v. Billingsley, 440 F.2d 823, 827 (7th Cir. 1971); People v. Wurbs, 38
Ill. App. 3d 360, 364, 347 N.E.2d 879, 883 (4th Dist. 1976); C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 95 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
36. See SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., No. 72-225 [1971-72 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,360 (D.D.C., filed Feb. 3, 1972); ABA Comm. on Counsel
Responsibility and Liability, The Code of Professional Responsibility of Lawyers Engaged in
Securities Law Practice, 30 Bus. LAW. 1289 (1975); Lipman, The SEC's Reluctant Police Force:
A New Role for Lawyers, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (1974).
37. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1980) provides that the Commission may deny the privilege of
appearing or practicing before it to any person found by the Commission
(i) not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others, or (ii) to be lacking
in character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper professional
conduct, or (iii) to have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the
violation of any provision of the federal securities laws,
Id. The Commission has brought section 2(e) proceedings against lawyers for matters such as
negligent failure to detect false statements in underwriting documents. See generally March,
Rule 2(e) Proceedings, 35 Bus. LAW. 987 (1980).
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answers on a case-by-case basis as they attempt to accommodate the strong
competing values involved.
Attracting Clients
A number of provisions of the Illinois Code regulate the manner in which
attorneys may hold themselves out to the public. The rules primarily concern
advertising and solicitation, topics in which the Illinois Code significantly
departs from the ABA Model Code. The departures were mandated by
recent United States Supreme Court decisions which broadened the scope of
constitutionally permissible conduct in the advertising and solicitation
areas. 38  In line with these decisions, the Illinois Code permits attorney
advertising 39 and recasts the traditional prohibition against in-person solici-
tation.40
Advertising and Publicity
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,41 two lawyers operating a legal clinic
advertised "legal services at very reasonable fees." 42 The advertisement
quoted a fee for a number of "routine" services including uncontested di-
vorces, personal bankruptcies and name changes. The attorneys, who were
licensed members of the Arizona State Bar, were charged in a complaint
filed by the State Bar's president with violating the state supreme court's
disciplinary rule which prohibited attorneys from advertising in newspapers
or other media.
The majority opinion began by analyzing the first amendment issue of
attorney advertising as a form of commercial speech. Expanding upon earlier
established principles that struck down regulations prohibiting advertise-
ment of prescription drug prices, 43 the Court held that the Arizona State
Bar's prohibition of lawyer advertising was unconstitutional as applied to the
advertising at issue. The Court emphasized that its holding did not extend to
38. See, e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (solicitation of clients by a non-profit
organization is constitutionally protected); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978)
(direct in-person solicitation by lawyer for pecuniary gain may constitutionally result in discipli-
nary action against lawyer); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (permitting the
advertisement of routine legal services).
39. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 2-101.
40. See id. Rule 2-103.
41. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Prior to the Bates decision, the traditional ban on lawyer advertis-
ing and solicitation had remained substantially intact. Canon 27 of the ABA Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics stated that "solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal
communications, or interviews, not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional." When
the Canons were superseded by the ABA Model Code in 1969, solicitation and all but the most
limited forms of advertising, such as letterheads and law lists, were still prohibited. ABA MODEL
CODE, supra note 8, DR 2-101 to -103 (1969). For an historical overview of the ban on
advertising and solicitation prior to the adoption of the ABA Model Code, see DINKER, supra
note 6.
42. 433 U.S. at 354. A copy of the advertisement challenged in Bates is reproduced at 433
U.S. at 385.
43. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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advertisements that incorporated claims related to the quality of legal serv-
ices nor to problems associated with in-person solicitation. 44
The Court recognized that even for the "routine" services advertised by
the Phoenix legal clinic some supplemental warning or disclaimer might be
necessary to assure the advertisement was neither false, deceptive, nor mis-
leading. 45 It also recognized that reasonable restrictions on the time, place,
and manner of lawyer advertising might be imposed, especially in light of
the special problems that could arise from advertising in the electronic
broadcast media. 46  Hence, in its narrowest sense, Bates stands for the
proposition that lawyers have the constitutional right to advertise in the print
media, including the prices of certain routine legal services. Underlying the
Bates decision, however, was the Court's conviction that a substantial major-
ity of the American public is inadequately informed about the cost and
availability of legal services. 47 Bates indicated that non-deceptive advertis-
ing by lawyers is a viable solution to that problem. 48
The advertising provisions of the Illinois Code do not reflect the narrow
holding of Bates, but rather its underlying rationale. Rule 2-101 permits
advertising "through any commercial publicity or other form of public com-
munication,"' 4 subject to five conditions. First, Rule 2-101(a) limits the
informative content of a legal advertisement to specified factual information
about the attorney and other information "which a reasonable person might
regard as relevant in determining whether to seek the attorney's services." 50
44. 433 U.S. at 366, 383-84.
45. Id. at 384.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 370. The Court cited statistics indicating that 70% of'the American public are
being inadequately served by the legal system. Id. at 376. Other statistics indicated that a
majority of people surveyed agreed that people will not retain lawyers "because they have no
way of knowing which lawyers are competent to handle their particular problems." Id. at
370-71 & n.23.
48. The Bates Court found that advertising "is the traditional mechanism in a free-market
economy for a supplier to inform a potential purchaser of the availability and terms of exchange"
and would facilitate the process of intelligent lawyer selection, particularly among "the not-
quite-poor and unknowledgeable." Id. at 376-77. The Court, holding untenable the argument
that legal advertising will raise the costs of legal services, stated:
Although it is true that the effect of advertising on the price of services has not been
demonstrated, there is revealing evidence with regard to products; where consumers
have the benefit of price advertising, retail prices often are dramatically lower than
they would be without advertising. It is entirely possible that advertising will serve
to reduce, not advance, the cost of legal services to the consumer.
Id. at 377.
For a more comprehensive discussion of the Bates decision, see Comment, Attorney Advertis-
ing is Commercial Speech Protected by the First Amendment: Bates v. State Bar, 37 MD. L.
REv. 350 (1977).
49. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 2-101. The Rule provides in relevant part: "A lawyer may
publicize himself as a lawyer through any commercial publicity or other form of public com-
munication (including any newspaper, magazine, telephone directory, radio, television, or other
advertising) ..... Id.
50. Id. Rule 2-101(a)(8).
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Second, the Code prohibits the use of any false or deceptive statement, or the
exclusion of any information necessary to make the advertisement true in
content. 5' Third, the information must be conveyed to the public in a
direct, dignified, and readily comprehensible manner. 52 Fourth, the adver-
tisement must not imply that any court, tribunal, or other public official is
subject to improper influence by the attorney. 53 Finally, the Code requires
that the lawyer approve and retain a prerecorded copy of any advertisement
transmitted over radio or television. 54
The Illinois provisions on lawyer advertising reflect a significantly differ-
ent approach from that adopted by the ABA Model Code. The ABA Code
sets forth a comprehensive list of the kinds of information permissible in legal
advertisements. 55  The Illinois Code, while not open-ended, does not ex-
pressly limit the kinds of information that legal advertisements may contain.
This approach should encourage experimentation to discover the techniques
most conducive to the informed selection of attorneys by the public. At the
same time, the limitations on advertising incorporated in the Illinois Code
provide standards by which hard-sell, giveaway, or flamboyant advertising
can be regulated by the court.
Solicitation
The Illinois Code provisions governing in-person solicitation were also
enacted in response to recent United States Supreme Court decisions.56 Un-
fortunately, the Court's opinions to date have invited an approach to the
regulation of solicitation conceptually different from that governing adver-
tising. Enforcement problems will inevitably follow, in part because the
distinction between advertising and solicitation is not always easy to ascer-
tain. 7
51. Id. Rule 2-101(b).
52. Id. Rule 2-101(c).
53. Id. Rule 2-101(d). Such statements are prohibited generally by Rule 9-101(c).
54. Id. Rule 2-101(e).
55. ABA MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 2-101(B)(1)-(25) (1980). The type of information
permitted by the ABA Model Code is limited to certain basic, factual data, such as the lawyer's
name, address, and telephone number, and specified information on fees, hourly rates, and fixed
fees for specific services.
56. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
57. See Sfikas, The Tension Between Legal Solicitation and the First Amendment, 60 Ctii.
B. REc. 14, 19 (1978); Simet, Solicitation of Public and Private Litigation Under the First
Amendment, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 93, 108. See also L. ANDREWS, THE BIRTH OF A
SALESMAN: LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION 9 (1980).
Illinois courts have declined to provide a definition of solicitation applicable in all cases, but
have frequently based findings of solicitation on the attorney's motives. See, e.g., Rhoades v.
Norfolk & W. Ry., 78 I11. 2d 217, 399 N.E.2d 969 (1979) (no unethical attorney solicitation
where client initiates contact); In re Heirsch, 10 Ill. 2d 357, 140 N.E.2d 825 (1956) (solicitation
exists where attorney paid runners and touters to visit and solicit accident victims in hospital).
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The Illinois Code Rule 2-103 defines solicitation as a "private communica-
tion"58 as distinct from an announcement publicly transmitted by print or
broadcast media. Another distinguishing feature is the selection of the poten-
tial client. Solicitation is typically directed at a person known by the lawyer
to have an immediate legal need, such as an accident victim. 59 Conversely,
advertising is directed to the general public.60 ' Thus, mail campaigns ad-
dressed to the general public are more properly regulated under rules related
to advertising rather than solicitation. "' It is conceivable, however, that
direct mail or other sorts of contacts targeted to an audience such as the
victims of a recent accident would qualify as a "private communication" as
defined by the Illinois Code.
Another distinguishing factor between advertising and solicitation is the
inherent potential for coercion present in solicitation situations. The poten-
tial, which increases when the communication is face-to-face, exists primar-
ily because of the client's immediate need for legal representation. The
Supreme Court, in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association,"' emphasized that
in-person solicitation may provide a one-sided presentation by the soliciting
58. Rule 2-103 of the Illinois Code applies by definition to "Private Communications Recom-
mending or Soliciting Professional Employment." Section 2-103(e) defines "private communica-
tion" to "include personal contact between a lawyer and an individual lay person, directly or by
telephone, and may include other in-person and written communications."
59. See Note, Legal Ethics-Ambulance Chasing, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 182, 186 (1955).
60. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1977). The Ohralik Court stated that
"[u]nlike a public advertisement, which simply provides information and leaves the recipient
free to act upon it or not, in-person solicitation may exert pressure and often demands an
immediate response, without providing an opportunity for comparison or reflection." Id. at 457.
61. See, e.g., Bishop v. Committee on Professional Ethics of Iowa State Bar, 521 F. Supp.
1219 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (Iowa bar disciplinary rules proscribing direct mail advertising by
attorneys and advertisements describing fees as "reasonable" or "moderate" violate the first
amendment); In re Madsen, 68 I11. 2d 472, 370 N.E.2d 199 (1977) (attorney's letter containing a
request for address changes, a description of the firm's practice, and general legal advice held not
improper solicitation); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Stewart, 568 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1978) (letters sent to
real estate agencies describing handling and prices of routine legal services held not solicitation);
Koffler v. Joint Bar Ass'n, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 412 N.E.2d 927, 432 N.Y.S.2d 872 (direct mail
solicitation of possible clients is protected commercial speech which may be regulated but not
proscribed), cert. denied, - U.S. __, 101 S. Ct. 1733 (1980). Contra, Florida Bar v.
Schreiber, 50 U.S.L.W. 2269 (Fla. Sept. 22, 1981) (letter sent by immigration lawyer to
international trade company held improper solicitation); In re Greene, 50 U.S.L.W. 2269 (N.Y.
Ct. App. Sept. 29, 1981) (distinguishing Koffler and holding improper "third party" solicitation
directed to real estate brokers seeking to represent clients of the brokers); Allison v. Louisiana
State Bar Ass'n, 362 S.2d 489 (La. 1978) (letters sent to employers describing a prepaid legal
services plan offered by attorneys held improper solicitation). For a criticism of the Allison
decision, see Note, Constitutional Law-First Amendment-State Bar Association May Constitu-
tionally Prohibit Attorneys From Soliciting Clients for Profit Through the Mail, 53 TUL. L. REV.
962 (1979). The United States Supreme Court has noted probable jurisdiction in a case which
may serve to clarify the status of direct mail. In re J, 609 S.W.2d 411 (Mo. 1980), prob. juris.
noted, - U.S. -. , 101 S. Ct. 3028 (1981).
62. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
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attorney and thereby encourage speedy and perhaps uninformed decision
making by the prospective client.6 3  In Ohralik, the respondent attorney
visited an automobile accident victim in the hospital and pressed her to sign
an agreement permitting him to represent her in future legal action. Al-
though she refused, the attorney photographed her in the hospital and inter-
viewed a passenger of the automobile. Both the victim and the passenger
eventually retained the attorney's services, but both clients subsequently
attempted to discharge him. Resisting discharge, the attorney withheld the
insurance settlement on the passenger's claim and collected a full one-third of
the victim's recovery even though she had retained a second lawyer to obtain
the settlement. A unanimous Supreme Court held that the attorney's coercive
conduct justified disciplinary action.
In a companion case, In re Primus, 4 the respondent attorney was on
retainer from the Carolina Council on Human Relations at whose request she
spoke to a group of welfare recipients who had been sterilized as a precondi-
tion to receiving welfare benefits. Following the speech, the attorney advised
one of the recipients by mail of the American Civil Liberties Union, and its
interest in representing sterilized women in a class action. There was no
evidence that the attorney received a referral fee or any compensation beside
the retainer she had previously been paid by the Council on Human Rela-
tions.6 5 The Primus Court reversed the imposition of disciplinary sanctions
because the attorney's conduct fell within "the generous zone of First
Amendment protection reserved for associational freedoms."6 6
The Primus decision affirmed the settled proposition that broader first
amendment protection exists for political speech than for commercial
speech.6 7 The decision left unresolved, however, the truly difficult question
presented by the previous solicitation cases. That question is whether non-
63. Id. at 457. The Court continued its discussion of the negative aspects of in-person
solicitation stating: "there is no opportunity for intervention or counter-education by agencies of
the Bar, supervisory authorities, or persons close to the solicited individual." Id.
64. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
65. Id. at 430 n.24.
66. Id. at 431. The Court relied on its decision in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), in
holding that Primus' activities involved constitutionally protected expression and association. In
Button, the Court held that the NAACP's activities in soliciting prospective plaintiffs in order to
conduct civil rights litigation, constituted "association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas,"
which does not involve substantive evils sufficient to justify prohibition. Id. at 430.
67. 436 U.S. at 438-39. The Court held that although in-person solicitation for pecuniary
gain may be prohibited if conducted under circumstances likely to result in deception or fraud,
associational solicitation may only be burdened with "carefully tailored regulation that does not
abridge unnecessarily the associational freedoms of nonprofit organizations, or their members,
having characteristics like those of the NAACP or the ACLU." Id. at 439. See generally Pulaski,
In-Person Solicitation and the First Amendment: Was Ohralik Wrongly Decided?, 1979 ARiz.
ST. L.J. 23; Comment, In re Primus and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association: A First
Amendment Challenge to Prohibitions on Lawyer Solicitation, 48 U. CIN. L. REv. 886 (1979);
Comment, Attorney Solicitation: The Scope of State Regulation After Primus and Ohralik, 12
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 144 (1978).
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coercive solicitation in furtherance of "commercial" goals is entitled to first
amendment protection."' Even less clear is the extent to which coercive or
deceptive solicitation in support of associational goals may be constitution-
ally protected.""
Moreover, as the Court conceded, 0 the distinction between commercial
and associational solicitation may in practice be difficult to draw. A non-
commercial interest is usually advanced when a lawyer seeks to ensure that a
private individual receives an adjudication of his or her claim through the
judicial process.7 Few organizations besides the American Civil Liberties
Union, litigate purely associational interests.
The ambiguities resulting from the Ohralik and Primus decisions were
adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court in In re Teichner.72  Teichner in-
volved two distinct solicitation situations, only one of which the court found
improper. The instance in which the respondent's solicitation activities were
constitutionally protected arose out of a railroad accident in Laurel, Missis-
sippi. The respondent attorney traveled to Mississippi at the request of a local
minister to advise accident victims and their families. Some of the potential
clients had already been contacted by the claims agent for the railroad's
insurer, who was attempting to negotiate settlements. Upon his arrival the
respondent visited accident victims and their families accompanied by an
aide of the minister. The visits, however, were not limited to members of the
minister's congregation.
73
Although the Illinois Supreme Court found that the lawyer's activities
constituted solicitation of legal business7 4 and that his motives were predomi-
nantly pecuniary, it held that his conduct was constitutionally protected. 75
After examining at length the Supreme Court's decisions in Ohralik and
Primus, the Illinois court concluded that where associational values are
implicated, in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain cannot be absolutely
prohibited. 76  Teichner, therefore, was not subject to discipline because,
68. Justice Powell, who wrote the opinion of the Court in both Ohralik and Primus, suggests
at one point that an absolute ban on in-person solicitation may be warranted because such
solicitation is likely to be injurious to the client. 436 U.S. at 466. Elsewhere, however, his
position on a flat ban is less clear. See, e.g., id. at 438-39. See generally Comment, Benign
Solicitation of Clients by Attorneys, 54 WASH. L. REV. 671 (1979).
69. See, e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438 & n.33, 439-40.
70. Id. at 438 n.32. "The line [between commercial and associational solicitation], based in
part on the motive of the speaker and the character of the expressive activity, will not always be
easy to draw, . . . but that is no reason for avoiding the undertaking." Id. (citing Virginia
Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 787-88 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)).
71. 436 U.S. at 441-42 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing as "lame" the Court's attempt
to distinguish Pri-mus' and Ohralik's protected solicitation).
72. 75 Ill. 2d 88, 387 N.E.2d 265 (1979).
73. Id. at 98, 387 N.E.2d at 267.
74. Id. at 99, 387 N.E.2d at 269.
75. Id. at 100-03, 387 N.E.2d at 269-71.
76. Id. at 103, 387 N.E.2d at 272.
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despite his pecuniary motive, the effect of his conduct was to further the
associational values of the community. 77 The court also examined the re-
spondent's conduct and concluded that there was not clear and convincing
evidence of the "substantive evils against which the prohibition of in-person
solicitation traditionally is directed. '" 78
The second series of events that led to disciplinary charges being brought
against Teichner arose out of an explosion in Decatur, Illinois. The respon-
dent went to Decatur and offered to pay cash to an airport auto rental
employee in return for introductions to the explosion accident victims. 7
Later, the respondent made an uninvited visit to a distraught victim and
asked to be retained for a substantial contingent fee. ° In addition, he
contacted various relatives of another accident victim, including the fiancee,
mother, and divorced wife of the victim, and attempted to establish a joint
representation. The Teichner court imposed discipline for the respondent's
conduct in this instance because the attorney's actions neither advanced
associational rights nor furthered the "dissemination of truthful information
about the availability of legal relief and legal services to members of the
public .... ,81
In resolving Teichner through the use of the Ohralik and Primus ration-
ales, the Illinois Supreme Court created a complicated analytical framework
for the future resolution of Illinois solicitation cases. This framework is
incorporated into Rule 2-103 which imposes a ban on solicitation by means
of a "private communication," except where the prospective client is a
relative or close friend of the lawyer, or where the communication is associa-
tional.8 2 The rule also prohibits associational solicitation or that of friends
and relatives where the communications are coercive, overreaching, or har-
assing.8 3
77. Id. at 104-05, 387 N.E.2d at 271. The Court stated:
We find it crucial that, in turning to the respondent for help, [the minister] was not
attempting to create a facade or device designed to facilitate the respondent's solici-
tation of remunerative employment. . . but rather was acting as part of a bona fide
relief effort created to further interests independent of the respondent's interest in
remunerative employment. Thus, even though respondent's motives were predomi-
nantly pecuniary, his conduct served to further the interests of [the minister's]
community, and a blanket prohibition of all contact between respondent and that
community would not pass constitutional muster.
id.
78. Id. at 105, 387 N.E.2d at 272.
79. Id. at 107, 387 N.E.2d at 273.
80. Id. at 108-09, 387 N.E.2d at 273.
81. Id. For a critical discussio' of the Teichner decision, see Note, Expanding Protection for
Attorney Solicitation-In re Teich...r, 28 DEPAUL L. REv. 1189 (1979).
82. Rule 2-103(b)(2) of the Illinois Code provides that a lawyer may solicit employment
"under the auspices of a public or charitable legal services organization or a bona fide political,
social, civic, charitable, religious, fraternal, employee or trade organization whose purposes
include but are not limited to providing or recommending legal services." ILL. CODE, supra note
1, Rule 2-103(b)(2).
83. Id. Rule 2-103(c).
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An alternative approach, suggested in Justice Marshall's concurring opin-
ions in Ohralik and Primus, would have been simply to ban solicitation that
involved misrepresentation, coercion, or harassment. A rule focusing on
these factors clearly would deny protection to hospital visits, knocking on
doors of accident victims, and other solicitation practices most in need of
restriction. More importantly, the focus of disciplinary enforcement would
be on the relatively straightforward inquiry of whether the potential client
was harassed or coerced.
After Ohralik, Primus, and Teichner, the Illinois court will be required to
make several inquiries when confronted with in-person solicitation. These
inquiries include whether the lawyer's motives and function were "pecu-
niary" rather than "ideological"; 8 4 whether apart from the lawyer's motives,
the "effect" of his or her conduct renders it protected; whether the goals
advanced by the solicited representation were "associational"; and whether
these goals, if associational, were "bona fide.
'8 5
Other "Publicity" Requirements
Apart from the provisions regarding solicitation and advertising, the Illi-
nois Code incorporates additional provisions governing how lawyers hold
themselves out to the public. Rule 2-102 encompasses three specific prohibi-
tions. First, lawyers who assume judicial, legislative, or other public posts
may not permit their names to be used in the notices, business cards, or
letterhead of their former firms. Second, firms that include lawyers licensed
in different jurisdictions must make clear in all notices and letterheads the
jurisdictional limitations on any firm members. Finally, lawyers who are
also engaged in another profession or business may not advertise that fact, or
indicate it on their letterhead or notices. Each of these provisions is a carry-
over from the detailed provisions of the ABA Model Code, DR2-102. Most of
the remaining detailed provisions of that rule were superseded by the Illinois
Code's liberalized rule on advertising and publicity. Among the other super-
seded provisions was an ABA rule against practicing law under a "trade
name."
86
84. In re Teichner, 75 Ill. 2d 88, 387 N.E.2d 265 (1979). The Teichner court interpreted
Primus as suggesting that where the conduct of an attorney falls between the two extremes
exemplified in Primus and Ohralik, "this court must first determine whether the attorney's
motive and function entitle his speech and conduct to the greater protection afforded associa-
tional activity for the advancement of beliefs and ideas." Id. at 103, 387 N.E.2d at 271.
85. Clarification of the present state of the law in the advertising and solicitation areas may
be forthcoming. The United States Supreme Court has noted probable jurisdiction of a case from
Missouri that involves issues of advertising, solicitation, and representations regarding specializa-
tion. In re J, 609 S.W.2d 411 (Mo. 1980), prob. juris. noted, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 3028
(1981).
86. As the Commentary to the Illinois Code observes: "It is difficult to make a principled
distinction between permitting a law firm to practice under the name of long-departed founding
fathers, while at the same time prohibiting the use of other names, e.g. 'Law Clinic.' " ILL.
CODE, supra note 1, Rule 2-102 (Committee Commentary).
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The matter of specialization is addressed in Rule 2-105, which generally
provides that lawyers or firms may specify and publicize fields of law in
which they concentrate, but may not hold themselves out as "certified" or as
"specialists." This restriction is designed to permit the dissemination of infor-
mation undeniably useful to potential clients, while avoiding the impression
that the attorney's or the firm's credentials have been approved by the
Illinois Supreme Court or other official certifying organization. The prohibi-
tion incorporated in Rule 2-105 would not appear to extend to the lawyer's
listing of membership in bar groups or organizations such as the American
Trial Lawyers Association. In keeping with the former practice under the
ABA Model Code, Rule 2-105 does authorize patent, trademark, and admi-
ralty attorneys to expressly designate themselves as such .87
Fees, Costs, and Client Funds
The Illinois Code contains a number of specific provisions regarding the
source and handling of fees, litigation costs, and the security of client funds,
and includes some significant departures from the provisions of the ABA
Model Code."'
87. Rule 2-105 states:
(a) A lawyer shall not hold himself out publicly as a specialist, except as follows:
(1) A lawyer admitted to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark
Office may use the designation "Patent," "Patent Attorney," "Patent Lawyer," or
"Registered Patent Attorney" or any combination of those terms, on his letterhead
and office sign.
(2) A lawyer engaged in the trademark practice may use the designation "Trade-
marks," "Trademark Attorney" or "Trademark Lawyer," or a combination of those
terms, and a lawyer engaged in the admiralty practice may use the designation
"Admiralty," "Proctor in Admiralty" or "Admiralty Lawyer," or a combination of
those terms, in any form of communication otherwise permitted under Rules 2-101
through 2-104.
(3) A lawyer or law firm may specify or designate any area or field of law in which
he or its partners concentrates or limits his or its practice. Except as set forth in Rule
2-105(a), no lawyer may hold himself out as "certified" or a "specialist."
Id. Rule 2-105(a).
88. Disciplinary Rule 2-106 of the ABA Model Code prohibits the charging of "clearly
excessive" fees, whereas, Illinois Rule 2-106 prohibits the charging of "excessive" fees. Rule 2-106
of the Illinois Code also sets out specific guidelines for contingent fee agreements where the ABA
Code does not. These are designed to ensure that the lawyer and client understand the terms of
their agreement. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 2-106 (Committee Commentary).
Rule 2-107 of the Illinois Code expands the ABA provision for division of fees among attorneys
and allows payment of a fee to the referring lawyer when that lawyer takes no part in the case.
This practice of compensating the nonparticipating referring attorney is prohibited by the ABA
rule. The departure from the ABA Model Code is to encourage lawyers to refer matters to those
more skilled in a particular area. Id. Rule 2-107 (Committee Commentary).
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Fees
Rule 2-106 prohibits agreements for an illegal or excessive fee, and lists a
number of factors to be considered in determining whether a fee is "exces-
sive. '" Included are a wide variety of factors, including the amount of time
involved, the novelty and difficulty of the question presented, the customary
fees in the locale for similar services, and the experience, reputation, and
ability of the lawyer. 0 A fee is defined as "excessive" by Rule 2-106(b)
"when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be
left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reason-
able fee."'9
The Illinois Code prohibits a lawyer from acquiring a proprietary interest
in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation which he is conducting
unless such interest is an attorney's lien or a contingent fee agreement. 92 Most
litigation regarding this rule has arisen from the issue of whether a lawyer
may serve as a member of a plaintiff class while he or a member of his firm
also serves as counsel for the class.9"
89. Id. Rules 2-106(b)(1)-(8). The rules are identical to DR 2-106 of the ABA Model Code,
with the exception of Illinois Rule 2-106(b)(2). DR 2-106(b)(2) of the ABA Model Code includes
as a factor the likelihood that acceptance of the employment would preclude other employment
by the lawyer only if that likelihood is apparent to the client. Rule 2-106 of the Illinois Code
deletes this italicized language.
90. Guidelines similar to those set forth in Rule 2-106 have often been followed by Illinois
courts, even before the advent of the ABA Model Code. See Entertainment Concepts, Inc., III v.
Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497, 508 (7th Cir. 1980); Bond v. Slanton, 630 F.2d 1231, 1234 (7th Cir.
1980);People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Pio, 308 I11. 128, 139 N.E. 45 (1923); MeMannomy v.
Chicago, Danville & Vincennes R.R., 167 Ill. 497, 47 N.E. 712 (1897).
Naturally, inflation has caused a change in judicial attitudes towards specific dollar amounts,
as evidenced by Harris v. Chicago Great W.R.R., 197 F.2d 829 (7th Cir. 1952) ($100 an hour fee
is so unreasonable as to shock judicial conscience). The reasonableness of contingent fees is
always subject to close scrutiny and supervision by the courts. Rosenthall v. First Nat'l Bank of
Chicago, 127 Ill. App. 2d 371, 262 N.E.2d 262 (1st Dist, 1970).
91. See, e.g., Flynn v. Kucharski, 59 Ill. 2d 61, 319 N.E.2d 1 (1974) (reduced fees from
$750,000 to $560,000 in class action proceeding); Donnelley v. Donnelley, 80 Ill. App. 3d 597,
400 N.E.2d 56 (1st Dist. 1980) (reduced aggregate allowance of $65,000 to $40,000 in divorce
proceeding); In re Estate of Enos, 69 Ill. App. 3d 129, 386 N.E.2d 1147 (5th Dist. 1979) (total
fee to attorney and executor reduced from $26,930 to $9,000). Such exercises of judicial supervi-
sion over fees such as those cited in this and the preceding note are not typically accompanied by
disciplinary sanctions. Such sanctions would be the subject of a separate proceeding.
92. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 5-103(a).
93. The courts have taken two approaches in deciding the impropriety of a lawyer serving as
both a member of a plaintiff class and counsel for that class. In Kramer v. Scientific Control
Corp., 534 F.2d 1085 (3d Cir. 1976), the court adopted a per se rule that an attorney-plaintiff
class representative may not also serve as counsel for the class. Id. at 1090. See also Turoff v. May
Co., 531 F.2d 1357 (6th Cir. 1976) (inherent conflict of interest for same individual to represent
class both as plaintiff and counsel). A second approach was recognized in Susman v. Lincoln
Am. Corp., 561 F.2d 86 (7th Cir. 1977). Susman rejected the per se rule in favor of a case-by-
case method of determining the existence of a conflict. Id. at 93-94. See, e.g., Fischer v.
International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 72 F.R.D. 170 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (fact that attorney was
plaintiff's son did not preclude him from representing class) Clark v. Cameron-Brown Co., 72
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Like the ABA Model Code, the Illinois Code permits attorney compensa-
tion in whole or part by acquiring an interest in the right to publish books or
articles on the subject of the case in which he was retained, but any "ar-
rangement or understanding" as to this form of compensation cannot be
made until the matter is fully concluded.9 4 This rule is a corollary to the
broader prohibition of Rule 5-104(a) against a lawyer transacting business
with a client when the two have conflicting interests and the client expects
the lawyer to exercise his professional judgment for protection of the client.
On its face, the rule restricting acquisition of publication rights presents
enormous difficulties. If acquisition of literary rights is contemplated, it is
unrealistic to suppose that no "understanding" will be reached while the
matter is pending. If there is such an understanding, the potential for a
conflict of interest is clear. For example, the value of the publication rights
may be increased by a decision to have the defendant stand trial rather than
to plead guilty, or to testify rather than to remain silent.9 5  Although courts
have deplored these inherent conflicts of interest, they have generally refused
to find in them prejudice sufficient to warrant a new trial or other relief.9 6
The Illinois Code's Rule 5-107(b) follows the lead of the ABA Model Code
regarding the source of attorney fees, by prohibiting the undisclosed accept-
F.R.D. 48 (M.D.N.C. 1976) (executor of estate was adequate class representative despite his role
as putative class representative, estate executor, and counsel for plaintiffs); Lamb v. United See.
Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 25 (S.D. Iowa 1972) (person acting as both attorney and plaintiff does not
detract from the viability of the class).
The Illinois Supreme Court adopted the per se rule because "it unequivocally clarifies a
question of class representation by counsel by avoiding any conflict at the very outset of the suit."
Barliant v. Follett Corp., 74 I11. 2d 226, 238, 384 N.E.2d 316, 321 (1978). See also Hamer v.
Board of Educ., 52 I11. App. 3d 531, 367 N.E.2d 739 (2d Dist. 1977) (adequacy of representation
may be questioned where plaintiff is class representative and its attorney without notice to other
members of the class).
94. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 5-104(b).
95. For example, in People v. Corona, 80 Cal. App. 3d 684, 145 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1st Dist.
1978), the court stated that:
by entering into the literary rights contract trial counsel created a situation which
prevented him from devoting the requisite undivided loyalty and service to his
client. From that moment on, trial counsel was devoted to two masters with con-
flicting interests-he was forced to choose between his own pocketbook and the best
interests of his client, the accused.
Id. at 721, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 915.
96. See, e.g., Wojtowicz v. United States, 550 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1977) (court did not regard
the practice of being paid from funds created by sale of movie rights as worthy, but concluded
that it did not render counsel's representation constitutionally defective); Ray v. Rose, 535 F.2d
966 (6th Cir. 1976) (defendant did not sustain burden of showing that he had been prejudiced by
contracts with writer who agreed to sell prisoner's story to finance defense); Ray v. Foreman,
441 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1971) (evidence was insufficient to support prisoner's claim that
attorneys representing him had fraudulently induced him to enter into contracts governing right
to proceeds from sale of book); United States v. Hearst, 466 F. Supp. 1068 (N.D. Cal. 1978)
(court would not vacate judgment because defense counsel had entered into contract to write a
book about defendant's trial). But see People v. Corona, 80 Cal. App. 3d 684, 145 Cal. Rptr. 894
(lst Dist. 1978) (publication contract was one element in broad pattern of incompetent represen-
tation which led to a reversal of defendant's conviction).
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ance of payment for legal services from anyone other than the client.9 7 A
relevant application of Rule 5-107 arises when a lawyer defends an individ-
ual, but is paid by that person's insurer. Such an arrangement is typically
made after full disclosure to, and with the consent of, the insured.98  Illinois
cases have held that an insured has the right to retain counsel of his or her
own choosing, at the insurer's expense, in a case in which a policy defense
obligation is undertaken subject to a reservation of rights by the company. 99
Whenever a lawyer is paid by someone other than the client, the Code
prohibits the lawyer from allowing his or her professional judgment to be
directed by the paying party. 00
Rule 3-103 prohibits a lawyer from forming a partnership with a non-law-
yer if any of the partnership activities will consist of the practice of law. A
related rule, 5-107(d), prohibits formation of a professional corporation or
association in which a nonlawyer owns stock or otherwise has the right to
direct the conduct of the professional affairs of the corporation or associa-
tion. Rule 3-102 prohibits a lawyer or law firm from sharing fees with a
nonlawyer except in specified circumstances. Those circumstances include
payment to the heirs of a decreased lawyer for completion of his or her
unfinished work, and paying retirement benefits to a firm's nonprofessional
employees.
Division of fees among lawyers for work on a single matter is governed by
Rule 2-107. When fees are to be split in proportion to the services performed,
the rule requires full written disclosure of the basis of the division, and the
client's written consent to the arrangement. In addition, the total fee paid by
the client must not exceed reasonable compensation for all of the legal
services rendered by the lawyers involved.
In a significant departure from the ABA Model Code, the Illinois Code
expressly sanctions payment of a referral fee even if the referring lawyer
97. Application of the Code's "payment by another" provisions has occurred, for example,
where attorneys representing witnesses before a grand jury have been compensated by the
witness' employer. In re Special February, 1975 Grand Jury, 406 F. Supp. 194 (N.D. III. 1975).
The ABA Model Code has also been applied where one defendant pays for the representation of a
codefendant. In re Murray, 266 Ind. 221, 362 N.E.2d 128 (1977) (paying defendant may not
confer with and instruct witnesses for the codefendant). See ILL. STATE BAR ASS'N COMM. ON
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, Nos. 261 (June 28, 1965), 272 (June 30, 1966) & 281 (Sept. 26,
1966).
98. For a brief, yet detailed, discussion of the ethical implications of representation of
insured individuals, see AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL BESPON-
SIBILITY 233-39 (1979).
99. See, e.g., Thornton v. Paul, 74 Ill. 2d 132, 384 N.E.2d 335 (1978) (when a conflict of
interest prevents an attorney from representing both an insurer and its insured, the insured has a
right to be represented by his own counsel and control his defense); Maryland Cas. Co. v.
Peppers, 64 Ill. 2d 187, 355 N.E.2d 24 (1976) (when an insurer has an obligation to defend but
has a conflict of interest with its insured, the insured may control his own defense at the insurer's
expense).
100. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 5-107(c). See In re Murray, 266 Ind. 221, 362 N.E.2d 128
(1977). See also note 97 supra.
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performs no services apart from the referral of the matter. 0 1 Such an
arrangement must meet several additional conditions. The disclosure signed
by the client must specify the "extent and basis" of the "economic benefit"
received by the referring lawyer. Furthermore, the referring lawyer must
agree to assume the same legal responsibility for the work as if he or she were
a partner of the receiving lawyer.10 2  The latter provision encourages the
referring lawyer to devote at least administrative attention to the progress of
the matter.
Rule 2-107(a)(4) broadly defines a referral fee as an "economic bene-
fit."10' An "established practice" of reciprocal referrals between two law-
yers is expressly included within this definition. When such a practice exists,
all provisions of Rule 2-107 appear to apply to every matter referred, even if
no other referral "fee" is paid in connection with any particular matter.
Neither the Code nor the Commentary offers guidance as to what constitutes
an "established practice" of reciprocal referrals.
Contingent fee agreements also cause occasional problems between attor-
ney and client. Hence, the Code requires that they be in writing, and set
forth the terms and conditions of the fee calculation as precisely as possi-
ble. 10 4 For example, the agreement should specify the fee in the event of
settlement, trial or appeal, and whether expenses are to be deducted before
or after the fee calculation.'0 5  The requirement that agreements be "in
writing" is expressly made inapplicable to commercial collections and insur-
ance company subrogation claims made in accordance with usual prac-
tices. 06
The Illinois Code continues the traditional prohibition against contingent
fee arrangements in criminal cases. 0 7 One rationale of this rule is to mini-
101. Rule 2-107(a)(2) of the Illinois Code is designed to eliminate the custom of providing
referring lawyers "make-work" after referral, and to encourage the referral of matters to lawyers
more skilled in the relevant area of practice. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 2-107 (Committee
Commentary).
102. Id. Rule 2-107(a)(1), (2).
103. Rule 2-107(a)(4) states:
For purposes of this rule, "economic benefit" shall include (a) the amount of partici-
pation in the fee received with regard to the particular matter; (b) any other form of
remuneration passing to the referring lawyer from the receiving lawyer, whether or
not with regard to the particular matter; and (c) an established practice of referrals
to and from or from and to the receiving lawyer and the referring lawyer.
Id. Rule 2-107(a)(4).
104. Id. Rule 2-106(c)(2). See Kravis v. Smith Marine, Inc., 15 Ill. App. 3d 494, 304 N.E.2d
720 (1st Dist. 1973) (agreement for contingent fee can never be implied but must be expressly
contracted for).
105. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 2-106(c)(2).
106. Id. Rule 2-106(c)(4).
107. Id. As noted in F. MAcKINNON, CONTINCENT FEEs FOR LEGAL SERVICES 52 (1964), little
case law exists in the area of contingent fees in criminal cases. One case suggests that the
rationale for the rule is the possible conflicting interests between attorney and client with regard
to plea bargaining. United States ex rel. Simon v. Murphy, 349 F. Supp. 818 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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mize the risk of subornation or perjured testimony. This rationale has been
cogently criticized on the grounds that the same risk is tolerated in civil
litigation, and substantial incentives for perjury are implicit in criminal
defense regardless of how the defense lawyer is to be compensated. 08 If
contingent fee arrangements may be justified to finance the meritorious
claims of lower income civil litigants, their use may be equally warranted to
finance the meritorious defenses of lower income criminal defendants. It is
true that a successful criminal defense does not generate a monetary recovery
from which the fee could be taken. However, this is more in the nature of a
practical reason why lawyers in such cases would not enter into contingent
fee agreements, rather than a proper basis for an ethical proscription against
them.
In the months following the passage of the Illinois Code, the question was
raised whether the Code has changed the former prohibition against contin-
gent fees in divorces and related proceedings. In In re Fisher,1 9 the Illinois
Supreme Court censured a lawyer for receiving an assignment from his client
of all alimony payments in excess of $100 per month, along with all rights in
her home, and all property settlement rights except those related to child
support." 0 After receiving the assignments, the lawyer repeatedly applied
to the divorce court to increase the support payments, based on his client's
alleged increased needs."' The beneficiary of these increased support pay-
ments would, of course, have been the lawyer, not the client.
The scam practiced by the respondent in Fisher was far more invidious
than a simple contingent fee arrangement tying the lawyer's compensation to
a percentage of the support payments. Nevertheless, Fisher has been widely
interpreted as imposing a general prohibition on contingent fee contracts in
divorce cases. 1 2 Acting on the recommendation of the Committee on Pro-
fessional Responsibility, the supreme court in late June, 1981 voted to amend
Rule 2-106(c)(4) to incorporate an express prohibition of contingent fee
agreements in domestic relations cases. The prohibition does not extend to
post-decree matters such as collecting arrearages in maintenance or child
support."13
An opposing or conflicting interest need not arise, however. See Schoonover v. State, 218 Kan.
377, 543 P.2d 881 (1975).
108. See F. MAcKINNON, CONTINGENT FEEs FOR LEGAL SERVCEs 52 (1964).
109. 15 Ill. 2d 139, 153 N.E.2d 832 (1958).
110. Id. at 155, 153 N.E.2d at 840.
111. Id. at 145-48, 153 N.E.2d at 837.
112. See Stoller v. Onuszko, 10 Ill. App. 3d 598, 295 N.E.2d 118 (1st Dist. 1973); See also
Bennett, Contracts-Sales, 1973 Survey of Illinois Law, 23 DEPAUL L. REv. 179, 211 (1973).
113. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 2 -106(c)(4), as amended by Illinois Supreme Court Order,
June 26, 1981, 1981 Ill. Legis. Serv. 129 (West).
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Costs
The Illinois Code retains the ABA Model Code's prohibition on advancing
or guaranteeing "financial assistance" to a client in connection with pending
litigation. It 4  The lawyer may, however, advance litigation expenses, in-
cluding investigation expenses, and costs of obtaining and presenting evi-
dence." 5 Witness fees are covered by Rule 7-109(c), which provides that an
attorney may pay witnesses' expenses and a reasonable compensation for
their loss of time. Expert witnesses may be paid a reasonable fee for their
professional services. The same rule prohibits witness compensation to be
contingent on the content of their testimony or the outcome of the case.'"
The constitutionality of this rule was upheld in Person v. Association of the
Bar of New York" 7 against a claim it denied litigants equal access to expert
witnesses.
Segregation of Client Funds
While judicial opinions, bar commentators, and law review articles such
as this debate the various niceties of ethical conundrums facing lawyers, the
most serious disciplinary problem encountered by enforcement officials con-
cerns the plain and simple conversion or commingling of client funds by their
attorneys. Such cases constitute approximately one-third of the disciplinary
proceedings heard by the Illinois Supreme Court."'
Rule 9-102(a) of the Illinois Code requires that lawyers segregate, in a
separate identifiable bank trust account, all client funds paid to the lawyer,
other than advances for costs and legal expenses. Any portion of such funds
114. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 5-103(b). Courts have viewed this provision strictly in
similar state codes, and have not made exceptions for indigent clients. See In re Berlant, 458 Pa.
439, 328 A.2d 471 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 964 (1975); In re Sandifer, 260 S.C. 633, 198
S.E.2d 120 (1973). Cf. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Edwins, 329 So. 2d 437 (La. 1976) (contrary
result should occur when the loans are made for a client's living expenses and client has
guaranteed reimbursement).
115. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 5-103(b).
116. Id. Rule 7-109(c). The rule tracks ABA Model Code DR 7-109(C). The prohibition of
contingent fees for experts has received considerable criticism. See, e.g., Person v. Association of
the Bar of New York, 414 F. Supp. 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Note, Contingent Fees to Expert
Witnesses-Is Disciplinary Rule 7-109(C) Dead?, 81 DIcK. L. REV. 655 (1977) (argues that it is
unconstitutional to prohibit a lawyer from paying contingent fee to expert witnesses); Note, The
Contingent Compensation of Expert Witnesses in Civil Litigation, 52 IND. L.J. 671 (1077)
(argues in favor of a court-appointed, impartial expert witness); Note, Contingent Fees for
Expert Witnesses in Civil Litigation, 86 YALE L.J. 1680 (1977) (argues for court-determined
contingent fees for expert witnesses). See also West Skokie Drainage Dist. v. Dawson, 243 I11.
175, 182, 90 N.E. 377, 379-80 (1909) (expert witness' possible financial interest in the litigation's
outcome is always an appropriate topic for cross examination); In re O'Keefe, 49 Mont. 369, 142
P. 638 (1914) (an attorney promised to pay material witnesses a sum of money in the event that
his client obtained a favorable judgment).
117. 554 F.2d 534 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 924 (1977).
118. Rolewick Interview, supra note 11.
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belonging to the lawyer may be withdrawn only after giving reasonable
notice to the client, and then only if there is no dispute about the lawyer's
right to the funds. 19 It is unclear whether. a retainer for services to be
provided constitutes the client funds as described by the rule. If the answer is
yes, the value of a retainer as a security for future payment may be seriously
eroded. Further, the rule requires that lawyers maintain "complete records"
of client funds, securities, and other property, and be able to render appro-
priate accounts to the client.12 0
There is no substitute for a good record-keeping system to ensure the
segregation and protection of client funds and to prevent inadvertent com-
mingling or unauthorized use of client funds by the lawyer. Accordingly, the
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission is presently considering
the creation of a model system to provide guidelines to Illinois lawyers
regarding the administration of client funds.'12
Conflicts of Interest
In the past several years there has been a marked increase in reported cases
in which one party seeks the disqualification of the opposing lawyer or law
firm because the opponent has breached the conflict of interest ethical
norms. 12 2  As these cases increase, so has judicial sensitivity to the potential
complexities of disqualification decisions. 2 1
Perhaps reflecting on its own experience in the area, a majority of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently observed that
119. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 9-102(b). Withdrawal without permission constitutes
conversion, with the usual penalty of disbarment. See In re Smith, 75 Ill. 2d 134, 387 N.E.2d
316 (1979) (power of attorney to endorse and negotiate checks does not give him the right to
convert those funds to own use), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 841 (1979); In re Broverman, 40 I11. 2d
302, 239 N.E.2d 816 (1968) (exculpatory agreement did not eliminate liability); In re Ahern, 26
I11. 2d 104, 185 N.E.2d 869 (1962) (wrongful conversion cannot be said to be mere carelessness or
mistaken judgment).
120. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 9-102(c)(3). On occasion, courts have been lenient regard-
ing this provision. See In re Brumund, 381 I11. 139, 44 N.E.2d 833 (1942) (attorney's failure to
promptly report receipt of money and account therefore, was not act of commission constituting
moral turpitude); People ex rel. Ludens v. Harris, 273 I11. 413, 112 N.E. 978 (1916) (failing to
report and account receipt of funds not conversion).
121. Rolewick Interview, supra note 11. Other states have enacted guidelines for maintaining
records of client's funds. See DELAWARE LAWYER'S CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR
9-102 (Interpretive Guideline No. 2); Wis. Sup. CT. Rule 11.05. See generally Comment,
Attorney Misappropriation of Client's Funds: A Study in Professional Responsibility, 10 U.
MIcH. J.L. REF. 415 (1977).
122. For competing views as to existence and magnitude of the increase, see Armstrong v.
McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 437 n.9, 447 n.2 (2d Cir. 1980) (Mulligan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), vacated on other grounds, _ U.S. - , 101 S. Ct. 911 (1981).
123. See, e.g., Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 753
(2d Cir. 1975) (when determining whether disqualification is appropriate, court must endeavor
to preserve the delicate balance between the client's right to counsel of his or her choice and the
legal profession's interest in maintaining the highest ethical standards); Government of India v.
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precise application of precedent is required in any judicial decision regarding
ethical principles because the distinction between ethical and reprehensible
conduct is often very fine. 124  Particularly in matters involving "large law
firms representing multi-billion dollar corporations in all segments of the
economy and the governmental process, it is becoming increasingly difficult
to insist upon absolute fidelity to rules prohibiting attorneys from represent-
ing overlapping legal interests."' 2  No other area of professional responsibil-
ity requires more familiarity with the case law which interprets the relevant
provisions of the Code. 126
To begin with a simple case, it is clear that under the Code an individual
lawyer may not represent two clients in a suit between them.127 Such dual
representation would require the lawyer to violate the proscription of Rule
4-101(b)(2) against a lawyer's using "a confidence or secret of his client to the
disadvantage of the client."1 28 Moreover, representing two opposing parties
Cook Indus., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1057, 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (disqualification determination
requires court to balance interests of attorney, his or her new law firm, present client, and
former client), afJ'd, 569 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1978). See generally Liebman, The Changing Law of
Disqualification: The Role of Presumption and Policy, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 996 (1979).
124. The court held that:
when dealing with ethical principles, it is apparent that we cannot paint with broad
strokes. The lines are fine and must be so marked. Guideposts can be established
when virgin ground is being explored, and the conclusion in a particular case can be
reached only after painstaking analysis of the facts and precise application of prece-
dent.
Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium, A/S v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 607 F.2d 186, 197
(7th Cir. 1979) (quoting Silver Chrysler Plymouth v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 753
n.3 (2d Cir. 1975)).
125. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 1284, 1287-88 (N.D. Ill.
1978), afJ'd in part sub nom., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978).
126. It should be noted that ethical questions regarding conflict of interest have typically been
pressed by private litigants rather than by disciplinary agencies. One reason for this trend is that
a successful disqualification motion may be an enormous tactical advantage to the prevailing
party.
127. Illinois cases not decided under the Code but reflecting this traditional prohibition
include In re LaPinska, 72 I11. 2d 461, 381 N.E.2d 700 (1978) (city attorney is prohibited from
representing simultaneously seller of a home in violation of zoning laws and buyer of such home
who files a complaint against seller based on these violations); People ex rel. Scholes v. Keithley,
225 I11. 30, 80 N.E. 50 (1906) (attorney who files a creditor's bill, on behalf of a client, seeking to
set aside a deed, is not permitted to represent simultaneously the party who executed the deed,
seeking to regain title); Beerly v. Wm. Meyer Co., 332 I11. App. 653, 75 N.E.2d 783 (1st Dist.
1947) (attorney is prohibited from representing majority stockholders and corporation in suit
brought by minority stockholders to recover misappropriations). See also ILL. STATE BAR ASS'N
COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, Nos. 166 (Apr. 21, 1958) & 603 (Apr. 4, 1978).
128. See, e.g., In re Michal, 415 Ill. 150, 112 N.E.2d 603 (1953) (attorney who drafts
antenuptial agreement is prohibited from subsequently representing his former client's spouse in
an action to invalidate that agreement); People ex rel. Livers v. Hanson, 290 Ill. 370, 125 N.E.
268 (1919) (attorney who provided legal advice to persons seeking to consolidate school districts,
cannot thereafter, in his capacity as state's attorney, file any information against such person on
ground that consolidation was illegal); People v. Gerold, 265 Ill. 448, 107 N.E. 165 (1914)
(attorney who receives confidences from client cannot thereafter testify against that client in a
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would violate Rule 5-105(b), which states that a lawyer may not represent
multiple clients "if the exercise of his independent professional judgment in
behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by his representa-
tion of another client. ... 29 Finally, such dual representation would
raise obvious questions under the general precept of Canon 9 which provides
that a lawyer should avoid "even the appearance of impropriety." 0 There
is no serious question that a single law firm could not represent both clients
in the foregoing circumstances. No matter how stringently the firm ensured
that separate lawyers represented each client and that the respective attor-
neys were effectively screened from receiving an adverse party's confidential
information, such representation would violate Rule 5-105(d). This Rule
prohibits any member of a lawyer's firm from representing a client when the
lawyer's own representation would violate Rule 5-105.
A slightly more complicated situation occurs when a lawyer or firm seeks
to represent client "A" in a suit against client "B" when it simultaneously
represents client "B" in matters totally unrelated to the litigation. 31  Here,
there is little danger that client confidences obtained in the one representa-
tion will be relevant to the other. There is, however, substantial danger that
the lawyer's independent judgment may be compromised by pressures placed
on him by client "B". Assigning each matter to different lawyers within the
state criminal proceeding as to matter which formed basis of the indictment); King v. King, 52
Ill. App. 3d 749, 367 N.E.2d 1358 (4th Dist. 1977) (attorney who counseled client contemplating
divorce is prohibited from subsequently representing former client's spouse in action for separate
maintenance).
129. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 5-105(b). See, e.g., Angell v. Petersen, 26 111. App. 2d 239,
167 N.E.2d 711 (2d Dist. 1960) (assistant state's attorney who is prosecuting defendant for
reckless homicide cannot also represent a victim of the automobile accident for which defendant
is responsible in a suit for damages). The ABA Model Code proscribes simultaneous representa-
tion of "differing" interests. ABA MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 5-105(B). To the extent
"differing" interests may be represented without "adversely affect[ing]" either, the Illinois Code
is more permissive than the ABA Model Code. In a close case under either code, the preferred
course is to obtain the consent of both clients after full disclosure. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule
5-105(c); ABA MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 5-105(C). See In re Spencer, 68 Ill. 2d 496, 370
N.E.2d 210 (1977) (although attorney who represented both executor and beneficiary under a
will was not found to have represented adverse interests, attorney was required to disclose his
dual representation to his clients).
1,30. The "appearance of impropriety" standard is appropriate in borderline cases in which it
is not clear that the attorney either revealed confidences of a former client to the disadvantage of
that client or engaged in multiple representation to the disadvantage of a client. See, e.g., In re
Williams, 57 I11. 2d 63, 309 N.E.2d 579 (1974) (attorney who represented client wishing to
change insurance policy beneficiary from his spouse to his children, following divorce decree,
cannot thereafter represent the spouse in attempting to collect the proceeds of those insurance
policies); In re Becker, 16 Ill. 2d 488, 158 N.E.2d 953 (1959) (attorney-alderman may not
represent a client before a zoning board of appeals if the board's actions are reviewable by the
city council). As the body of disqualification law has grown, however, resort to the use of the
vague "appearance of impropriety" standard has declined. See notes 122-125 and accompanying
text supra and notes 137-162 and accompanying text infra.
131. See ILL. STATE BAR ASS'N COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 603 (Apr. 4,
1978).
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firm and erecting a "Chinese Wall" between them is of limited efficacy. The
risk is not that information will leak from one lawyer to the other, but that
the firm itself will experience a conflict and its business interests be better
served by "pulling its punches" for one client or the other. In these circum-
stances, Rule 5-105 is violated and both the lawyer and the lawyer's firm are
disqualified from the dual representation. 32
The real difficulties begin when a lawyer ceases to represent a client, and
then seeks to represent a different client in a matter that bears some relation
to the representation of the former client. The risk is that secrets revealed by
the first client to the lawyer may be used to the disadvantage of that client in
the subsequent proceedings, thereby violating Rule 4-101(b). In cases of this
sort, the question is whether there is a "substantial relation" between the
subject matter of the two representations. 133 That inquiry requires an anal-
ysis of the issues involved in both representations and of the likelihood that
confidential information given to the lawyer in connection with the former
representation would be relevant to the pending litigation. 34 The party
132. See, e.g., International Business Mach. Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978)
(firm disqualified from representing antitrust plaintiff in suit against IBM, for which it was
handling labor relations representations). But see Unified Sewerage Agency of Washington
County, Ore. v. Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1981) (rejecting per se ban on simultaneous
representation of clients with adverse interests, in unrelated matters). Cf. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. Rio Algom, Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 1284, 1287-88 (N.D. Ill.), aJ 'd in part sub nom.,
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.) (concurrent represen-
tation of petroleum trade association and plaintiff suing corporate members of the association for
alleged price-fixing in the uranium industry prohibited), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978);
People v. Grigsby, 47 Ill. App. 3d 812, 365 N.E.2d 481 (1977) (criminal case which held it to be
reversible error for the trial judge to refuse to permit the withdrawal of defense counsel who had
consulted with the complaining witness as a prospective client in an unrelated case). The
Grigsby court held that the disqualification of the lawyer involved compelled the disqualifica-
tion of his entire firm under Illinois Rule 5-105.
133. The substantial relationship test initially was formulated in T.C. Theatre Corp. v.
Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Guidelines recently were enunciated
in Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1978), in which the court
set forth a three-step test:
Initially, the trial judge must make a factual reconstruction of the scope of the prior
legal representation. Second, it must be determined whether it is reasonable to infer
that the confidential information allegedly given would have been given to a lawyer
representing a client in those matters. Finally, it must be determined whether that
information is relevant to the issues raised in the litigation pending against the
former client.
Id. at 225. See also ILL. STATE BAR ASS'N COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 363
(June 26, 1971).
134. See, e.g., Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 1980) (law firm for bankruptcy
trustee disqualified when it had formerly represented defendant corporation in a secondary
offering of securities); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1978)
(defendant's counsel disqualified for former representation of co-defendant on a substantially
related matter); Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209, 223-24 (N.D. Ill. 1975)
(preparation of pre-organization subscription agreement for corporation did not prevent counsel
from subsequently representing a plaintiff in a shareholders derivative suit against the corpora-
tion), modified, 532 F.2d 1118 (1976).
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seeking disqualification need not show that its former lawyer received confi-
dential matter that might be used in the present litigation. Courts have
consistently held that such a requirement unfairly imposes an obligation to
disclose the very confidences that the moving party seeks to protect. 35
Hence, a showing that the two matters are substantially related gives rise to
an irrebuttable presumption that client confidences have been disclosed,
thereby requiring disqualification of the lawyer from the subsequent litiga-
tion. '31
An additional layer of analysis is added to the foregoing example when the
same law firm, but not the same individual lawyer, seeks to represent a client
in a matter substantially related to its representation of a former client. In
this area of "vicarious disqualification," courts have increasingly rejected
inflexible norms-such as the Canon 9 mandate to avoid even the appear-
ance of impropriety-in favor of careful analysis of the facts of each individ-
ual situation.
An illustrative case is Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium A/S v. Baxter
Travenol Laboratories, Inc.'37 In Novo, Baxter and Novo had been involved
in patent interference litigation arising out of two competing patent applica-
tions. Attorney Granger Cook, while a member of the partnership desig-
nated by the court as the Hume firm, represented Baxter. 3s Novo finally
prevailed in this dispute in 1976, at which time Baxter anticipated that a
patent infringement action would be instituted against it by Novo. 39  Cook,
while still a partner at Hume, conferred for several hours with Baxter
attorneys regarding the prospect of such an action and the possibility of
initiating a preemptive declaratory judgment proceeding against Novo. Be-
fore any litigation was instituted, Cook left the Hume firm taking the Baxter
account with him. Two months after Cook's departure, Novo, now repre-
sented by the Hume firm, filed its infringement action against Baxter. Bax-
ter's motion to disqualify the firm was denied by the trial court. 40
135. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 224 n.3 (7th Cir. 1978);
Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973); T.C. Theatre Corp. v.
Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). But see Mullaney, Wells & Co.
v. Savage, 78 I11. 2d 534, 554, 402 N.E.2d 574, 584 (1980). The Illinois Supreme Court denied
the Savage defendant's motion to bar plaintiff's law firm from the case on an alleged conflict of
interest, because the defendant failed to allege how he was prejudiced by being previously
represented by plaintiff's law firm. Since the motion was also denied because not timely made, it
is unclear whether a showing of specific confidences disclosed to the adverse party's counsel
would be held a predicate to disqualification by the Illinois Supreme Court.
136. See Ruder, Disqualification of Counsel: Disclosures of Client Confidences, Conflicts of
Interest, and Prior Government Service, 35 Bus. LAW. 963 (1980).
137. 607 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1979).
138. The firm was the Chicago patent law firm of Hume, Clement, Brinks, William, Olds &
Cook, Ltd. Id. at 187.
139. Id.
140. Id. The trial court noted that the Hume firm's services constituted approximately two
percent of Baxter's total representation. Id. at 187-88.
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On appeal,' 4 ' the Seventh Circuit first found that a "substantial relation-
ship" existed between the subject matter of the pending litigation and the
conferences between Cook and the Baxter lawyers held prior to Cook's
departure from Hume. As noted above, the finding of a substantial relation-
ship gave rise to an irrebuttable presumption that client confidences were
transmitted to Cook. 42  Concerning the second question-whether Cook's
knowledge should be imputed, thereby requiring the vicarious disqualifica-
tion of the Hume firm from representing Novo-the panel, relying on "the
direction of Canon 9," held that disqualification was proper regardless of
whether confidential information was actually received by other members of
the firm. 14:1
On rehearing, the Seventh Circuit reversed the panel and denied the
motion to disqualify. The full court agreed that a substantial relationship
existed between the two matters, and recognized as a consequence an irre-
buttable presumption that confidential information had passed from Baxter
to Cook individually. It held, however, that vicarious disqualification of
Cook's former firm required at least some showing that confidential informa-
tion had passed from Cook to his former partners. While the Court was
willing to presume the transmittal of information within the firm, it held
that this second level presumption was rebuttable. 44 After consideration of
the submitted affidavits, the court found that no showing had been made
that any confidences imparted to Cook by Baxter had been passed on to any
of Cook's former partners or associates. 4 5 Hence, the district court's denial
of disqualification was affirmed.
Novo only begins to suggest the complexities raised by vicarious disqualifi-
cation. One problem not addressed by Novo, but recognized by the Second
Circuit, involves a so-called "peripheral representation exception"' 4 to the
substantial relationship test. The exception states that a lawyer marginally
involved in representing one client-as in doing legal research while an
associate at a law firm representing that client-does not carry with him the
germs of automatic disqualification when he leaves that firm and joins
another that represents clients with interests adverse to his former client. As
the Second Circuit observed, "there is reason to differentiate for disqualifica-
141. Denials of disqualification motions have since been held to be nonappealable interlocu-
tory orders. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981). Firestone expressly
reserved the question whether orders granting disqualification are appealable. At least two
circuits have subsequently held that they are. Duncan v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 646 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litigation, TRADE REG.
RE. (CCH) 1 64,323 (9th Cir. 1981).
142. 607 F.2d at 192.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 197.
145. Id.




tion purposes between lawyers who become heavily involved in the facts of a
particular matter and those who enter briefly and on the periphery for a
limited and specific purpose related solely to legal questions." 147 This excep-
tion was expressly designed to avoid unnecessary constriction of the careers of
lawyers beginning their practices with large firms.
A second complication not addressed by Novo is the feasibility of screening
procedures-such as the erection of a so-called "Chinese Wall"-between
lawyers in the firm having actual knowledge of confidential information
received from a client and those seeking to represent another client against
the first client in a related matter. This question was not presented in Novo
because there was no showing that any member of the Hume firm had actual
knowledge of confidential information imparted by Cook. 148
Initially, the Seventh Circuit has taken a hostile view of the efficacy of the
"Chinese Wall" as a means of preventing passage of confidential information
relevant to related matters.149  A less absolute approach is developing else-
where. In an opinion likely to be influential, the Second Circuit, sitting en
banc, recently approved screening procedures implemented by the firm of a
former SEC lawyer.5 0
Special Case of the Former Government Lawyer
Policy concerns which apply to lawyers in general may also apply when a
former government lawyer or his firm represents a private client in a matter
relating to the lawyer's responsibilities in his former government employ-
ment. Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B) of the ABA Model Code prohibits an
attorney's acceptance of "private employment in a matter in which he had
substantial responsibility while he was a public employee."'15 The defini-
147. Id.
148. Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium A/S v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 607 F.2d
186, 197 (7th Cir. 1979).
149. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1321 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978); Schloetter v. Railoc of Indiana, Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 710 (7th Cir.
1976) (dictum).
150. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S.
1106 (1981) (vacated pursuant to Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981));
ILL. STATE BAR ASS'N COMM. ON PnOFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 701 (1981) (dictum).
Other courts have allowed similar screening procedures. Central Milk Producers Coop. v. Sentry
Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1978); Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct.
CI. 1977); United States v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 97,566 (D.D.C.). But see Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1980)
(screening held insufficient). See generally Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in
the Legal Profession, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1244, 1352-73 (1981); Comment, The Chinese Wall
Defense to Law-Firm Disqualification, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 677 (1980).
151. ABA MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 9-101(B). A related provision is contained in ABA
Model Code, 9-101(A) which prohibits a lawyer from accepting "private employment in a
matter upon the merits of which he has acted in a judicial capacity." Id. DR 9-101(A). See, e.g.,
Powers v. Kansas Dept. of Social Welfare, 208 Kan. 605, 493 P.2d 590 (1972) (judicial capacity
construed to include administrative positions).
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tion of the term "matter" incorporates some of the same considerations that
underlie the previously discussed "substantial relationship" test. 15 2
The equivalent of the "peripheral representation exception" has not been
articulated in the case law, but that exception is inherent in the wording of
the ABA's DR 9-101(B), which requires "substantial responsibility" on the
part of the lawyer. There is some debate whether "personal" responsibility is
tantamount to "substantial" responsibility. 15 3 The Illinois Code expressly
recognizes this distinction, and bars appearances by a lawyer before an
agency only if he had "personal and substantial" participation in the matter
while at the agency. 15 4 A broader rule of disqualification is incorporated
into the Illinois Code for lawyers who exercised supervisory responsibility in
government. Those lawyers are disqualified from any subsequent appear-
ance on matters that were under their "official responsibility," even if their
participation was neither personal nor substantial. ss
A second aspect of the former government lawyer problem has no analog
in the problems faced by private lawyers. Public criticism of the so-called
"'revolving door" by which lawyers move in and out of public service does not
stem entirely from the notion that these lawyers or their firms may represent
both sides of the same or similar issues on the public and private side of the
revolving door. Rather, the criticism is derived from a belief that a lawyer's
friendships and "connections" within a government agency make it appro-
priate to preclude a lawyer from appearing before an agency on any matter
after his or her departure, not just on matters from which he was officially
responsible.
Various federal agencies have drafted regulations to deal with this prob-
lem, and new federal legislation limits the activities of all former government
employees, including lawyers.156 The legislation does not impose a flat ban
on representation before the lawyer's former agency, but does impose a
two-year ban on appearances regarding any matter "actually pending under
[the lawyer's] official responsibility as an officer or employee within a period
of one-year prior to the termination of such responsibility .... " 157
The Committee on Professional Responsibility also wrestled with the prob-
lem of an appropriate time-limited ban on appearances before the lawyer's
former agency. The Committee's initial submission to the supreme court
included a suggested Rule 9-101(c), establishing a ban on any appearance
before the agency for a period of six months, and a ban on appearances for
two years after the termination of the lawyer's employment on any matter
152. See ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, OPINIONS, No. 342 (Nov.
24, 1976). See notes 133-136 and accompanying text supra.
153. See Note, Conflicts of Interest and the Former Government Attorney, 65 GEO. L.J. 1025
(1977). See also AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
425-28 (1979).
154. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 9-101(b).
155. Id.
156. 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1979).
157. Id. § 207(b)(3).
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that was pending while he or she was employed by the public body. After the
Committee's initial proposal was circulated, the Illinois State Bar Association
suggested that the two-tiered system be replaced with an unconditional
one-year ban on all appearances before the agency. This ban would be
applied without regard to whether the matter had been pending before the
agency or was one on which the lawyer had personal involvement or exer-
cised supervisory responsibility while in the government. After the court's
suggestion to take another look at the matter, the Committee decided to
adopt the Illinois State Bar Association approach.
Ultimately, the court chose to approve neither the Committee's initial
proposal, nor the Illinois State Bar modification. As adopted, Rule 9-101(b)
prevents a lawyer from appearing before the body on any matter "in which
during the public employment the lawyer participated personally and sub-
stantially or which was under his official responsibility." The rule does not
ban appearances on matters for which the lawyer had no responsibility or
involvement. The most significant definitional problem presented by this
rule is the extent to which matters pending before a public body will be
deemed to be under the "official responsibility" of lawyers employed by
those bodies, particularly smaller agencies that are common in county and
local governments. 158
In dealing with vicarious disqualification of the former government law-
yer's firm, the Illinois Code has deliberately narrowed the provision of the
ABA Model Code, by eliminating automatic disqualification of the firm due
to the lawyer's personal disqualification under Canon 9.159 The Illinois rule
implicitly requires that the lawyer involved be screened from participation in
the firm's representation. 10 The ABA has sought to mitigate harsh applica-
tions of its own rule in an ethics opinion stating that firm disqualification is
not necessary where screening procedures approved by the government
agency insure that the government's former employee does not participate in
the private representation.'"' The more flexible approach incorporated in
the Illinois Code may be finding increased receptivity in the courts. 6
158. Id. Rule 9-101(b) (Committee Commentary).
159. Compare ABA MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 5-105(D) ("if a lawyer is required to'
decline employment or to withdraw from employment under a Disciplinary Rule .. ") (em-
phasis added) with ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 5-105(d) ("if a lawyer is required to decline
employment or to withdraw from employment under Rule 5-105 .... ) (emphasis added). See
also Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (discussed in note 122 supra).
160. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 9-101 (Committee Commentary).
161. ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, OPINIONS, No. 342 (Nov. 24,
1976). In Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791, 794 (Ct. Cl. 1977), the court held that a
government agency cannot unjustifiably withhold consent if the screening procedures appear
sufficient.
162. See notes 149-150 and accompanying text suprq.
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MISCELLANEOUS ADDITIONAL CODE PROVISIONS
The Illinois Code imposes additional requirements that do not fall neatly
into the general categories previously discussed. Most of these requirements
are contained in Canons 6, 7, and 8.
Rule 7-101 and 7-102 set out important limits on the lawyer's duty to
zealously represent a client's interest. Rule 7-101 makes clear that zealous
representation does not include discourtesy or offensive tactics.163 In addi-
tion, it authorizes a lawyer to refuse to participate in conduct that he
believes to be unlawful, even if the conduct is arguably legal. Rule 7-102
adopts various prohibitions from the ABA Model Code including assertion of
a position merely for purposes of harassment; knowingly advancing a claim
or defense that is unwarranted under existing law, unless it can be supported
by a good faith argument for modification of existing law; 1 4 knowingly
using false evidence or making false statements of law or fact; 1 5 and counsel-
ing or assisting a client in conduct the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudu-
lent. 166
163. See, e.g., Ruggiero v. Attore, 51 Ill. App. 3d 139, 366 N.E.2d 470 (1st Dist. 1977)
(reasonable professional regard and civility should compel frank and open communication with
successor counsel); George F. Mueller & Sons, Inc. v. Ostrowski, 19 I11. App. 3d 973, 313 N.E.2d
684 (1st Dist. 1974) (responsibilities to client do not require a lawyer to disregard professional
courtesies to opposing counsel, including adherence to local customary practices designed to
assure substantial justice between the parties); People v. Miller, 130 Ill. App. 2d 637, 265 N.E.2d
175 (2d Dist. 1970) (a lawyer is obliged to represent his client diligently, courageously and
vigorously, but must remain within bounds of proper conduct). But see In re Dellinger, 370 F.
Supp. 130,4 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (attorneys may be persistent, vociferous, contentious and imposing,
even to the point of appearing obnoxious, when acting in behalf of a client), aff'd, 502 F.2d 813
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975).
164. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 7-102(a)(2). See, e.g., People v. Barnes, 14 Ill. App. 3d
989, 303 N.E.2d 775 (1st Dist. 1973) (attorney should not use frivolous points to defend his client
which are contrary to the law and the facts).
165. See, e.g., United States v. Abrams, 427 F.2d 86, 91 (2d Cir.) (attorney convicted of
knowingly making a false statement where he acted in reckless disregard of whether his client's
statements were true, and with a conscious decision to avoid learning the truth), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 832 (1970); In re Sarelas, 360 F. Supp. 794 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (disbarment justified upon
filing of defamatory and frivolous litigation, alleging conspiracy of state court judges, attorneys
and individuals without supporting facts); In re Carr, 377 Ill. 140, 36 N.E.2d 243 (1941) (an
attorney who on the basis of false evidence and false representations seeks to secure a decree,
subjects himself to disbarment); Davis v. Davis, 13 I11. App. 2d 459, 268 N.E.2d 491 (3d Dist.
1971) (court condemned attorney's assertion regarding the existence of documents which were
actually nonexistent).
166. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 7-102(a)(7). See United States v. Grasso, 552 F.2d 46 (2d
Cir. 1977) (disclosure of perjurious nature of prosecuting witnesses' testimony for purposes of
dismissing complaint rather than for impeachment not an improper trial tactic when defense
counsel was unaware of the perjury when witness was called to testify). Cf. Hawk v. Superior
Court of Solano County, 42 Cal. App. 3d 108, 116-17, 116 Cal. Rptr. 713, 718 (1974) (attorney
cited for contempt for advising client not to provide handwriting exemplar ordered by the
court), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975). But see Maners v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975)
(attorney may not be penalized for good faith advice to client to disobey a court order in exercise
of fifth amendment rights). See also notes 34 & 35 and accompanying text supra.
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Rule 7-104 prohibits direct communication between a lawyer and a party
to the case if the attorney knows that the party is represented by another
lawyer. Similarly, Rule 7-110(b) prohibits direct ex parte communications
between a lawyer and a judge without notice to the opponent.16 7 Rule 7-106
sets out additional rules of courtroom conduct, including a requirement that
lawyers disclose to the court legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction
known to be directly adverse to the position of his client and not disclosed by
opposing counsel. 6 8
The prohibition against a lawyer's assertion of personal knowledge or
opinion about facts in issue or the merits of litigation' is related to the
Code's more general prohibition against a lawyer representing a party in a
proceeding in which the lawyer is to be called as a material witness. 170 The
rationale for these rules is the potential tension between the lawyer's role as
an advocate and his role as a witness whose credibility on factual matters
must be resolved by the trier of fact.'71 The rule recognizes limited excep-
tions where the testimony will only relate to uncontested or formal matters,
to the nature and value of the legal services rendered by the lawyer, or to any
other matter if disqualification of the lawyer would work a substantial
hardship on the client. ' 72
Rule 7-107 modifies the ABA Model Code's regulation regarding trial
publicity, partially in response to criticism of the ABA provisions by the
Seventh Circuit.17 3 As modified, the Rule prohibits extra-judicial statements
167. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 7-110(b). See Heavey v. State Bar, 131 Cal. Rptr. 406, 551
P.2d 1238 (1976) (attorney suspended for commingling funds and communicating on merits with
judge in absence of opposing counsel).
168. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 7-106(b)(1). See United States v. Ott, 489 F.2d 872 (7th
Cir. 1973) (principle underlying rule concerning fraudulent, deceitful or otherwise illegal con-
duct by a participant in a proceeding is broad enough to encompass deceitful omission of
counsel's failure to cite pertinent legal authority contrary to his position in court). Cf. People ex
rel. Dealy v. Case, 241 Ill. 279, 89 N.E. 638 (1909) (attorney for complainant in divorce case
must disclose prior adjudication between parties dismissing the bill for want of equity); Davis v.
Davis, 131 I11. App. 2d 459, 268 N.E.2d 491 (1st Dist. 1971) (attorney's assertion of facts on
appeal as documented on the record, where no such documents existed construed as misleading
the court); People v. Sleezer, 8 I11. App. 2d 12, 130 N.E.2d 302 (2d Dist. 1955) (attorneys, as
officers of the court, are under a duty to make full and frank disclosure of all matters and facts
which court ought to know); State v. White, 94 Wash. 2d 498, 617 P.2d 998, 1001 (1980)
(defendant's counsel must advise the court if aware that trial date is fixed beyond the sixty-day
limit prescribed by court rule). But see ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES,
OPINIONS, No. 314 (Apr. 27, 1965) (lawyer appearing before I.R.S. is under a duty not to
mislead, but not under duty to disclose weakness in his client's case). See also note 25 supra.
169. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rules 7-106(c)(3)-(4).
170. Id. Rule 5-102.
171. See Comden v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 20 Cal. 3d 906, 145 Cal. Rptr. 9,
576 P.2d 971, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978); See also Enker, The Rationale of the Rule that
Forbids a Lawyer to be Advocate and Witness in the Same Case, 1977 AM. B. FOUNDATION
RESEARCH J. 455.
172. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 5-101(b)(1)-(4).
173. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427
U.S. 912 (1976). In Bauer an association of Chicago lawyers challenged the constitutionality of
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by lawyers that "pose a serious and imminent threat to the fairness of a trial
or administrative proceeding." 174  In addition, for criminal matters, the
Rule lists information appropriate for disclosure to the press and public, 75 as
well as information that normally should not be disclosed. 17  Among the
information listed as not appropriate for disclosure is that concerning the
prior criminal record or character of the accused, the existence or content of
an accused's statement, and the identity of prospective witnesses. 77 Disclo-
sure even of such listed information does not, however, constitute a per se
violation of the rule. The court must find that the disclosure did in fact
create a serious and imminent threat to the fairness of the trial. The scope of
Rule 7-107 extends to civil actions and administrative proceedings, pertain-
ing again to the release of information creating a serious and imminent
threat to the fairness of such proceedings.
Communications with jurors are prohibited by the Illinois Code not only
during the pendency of the trial, but also until the juror's venire has been
discharged. 78  Hence, the Rule permits consultation with jurors for the
purpose of self-education, but only when such jurors cannot possibly serve
immediately thereafter on another panel before the same lawyer.
A lawyer cannot "give or lend any thing of value to a judge, official or
employee of a tribunal."'' 71 So-called "tips" to clerical employees of the
courts, the subject of recent investigations in Cook County, clearly fall
within the scope of this Rule. 80 An exception permits contributions by
lawyers to the campaign funds of candidates for judicial office.' 8' The
Committee on Professional Responsibility initially debated the propriety of
this exception on the basis that it is virtually impossible to keep the names of
contributors from candidates. In the end, however, policy as well as consti-
tutional considerations weighed against restrictions on contributions by law-
yers to political campaigns.18 2
Rule 1.07 of the District Court's Criminal Rules, and Disciplinary Rule 7-107 of the American
Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility. The lawyers contended that the "reason-
able likelihood of interference with a fair trial" standard employed by these rules violated first
amendment rights and was vague and/or overbroad. The court found the standard to be
overbroad and applied the standard formulated in Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (7th
Cir. 1970), that only those comments which pose a "serious and imminent threat of interference
with the fair administration of justice" can be constitutionally proscribed. 522 F.2d at 249.
Nearly identical language is incorporated in Rule 7-107 of the Illinois Code.
174. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 7-107(a).
175. Id. Rule 7-107(c).
176. Id. Rule 7-107(b).
177. Id. Rule 7-107(b)(1), (2), (4).
178. Id. Rule 7-108.
179. Id. Rule 7-110(a).
180. Counter clerks in the Circuit Court of Cook County were recently reprimanded for
helping lawyers choose judges in the divorce division in violation of court rules that specify
sequential assignment of judges. All implicated clerks passed lie detector tests designed to
determine whether any money was received in return for assisting lawyers. See Chicago Trib-
tine, Mar. 11, 1981, § 2 at 1, col. 5.
181. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 7-110(a).
182. Id. Rule 7-110 (Committee Commentary).
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The conduct of a lawyer holding office as a public official is regulated by
Rule 8-101(a). The Rule prohibits an official from using his office to attempt
to influence a tribunal to act in his or his client's favor, accepting anything of
value that is offered for the purpose of influencing his actions as a public
official, or representing any client, including any public body, in promoting
or opposing proposals pending before the public body of which he is a
member.'-8 3
The Code addresses attorney competence in Rule 6-101. This Rule pro-
hibits a lawyer's handling a matter that he knows he is not competent to
manage without the association of a competent lawyer, handling a matter
without adequate preparation or neglecting a matter entrusted to him.' 84
The three subparagraphs of Rule 6-101 provide relatively objective criteria as
bases for disciplinary sanctions. After some debate, the Committee on Profes-
sional Responsibility elected not to recommend a more general proscription
against negligent representation, and the court did not adopt such a rule on
its own initiative.15  Rule 6-101 does not require establishment of a pattern
of neglect to warrant imposition of discipline. 8  The scope of enforcement
and of sanctions is left to the Disciplinary Commission and, ultimately, to
the court. 8 7
The provisions of the Code do not supplant the standard of care owed by
lawyers to their clients, nor the civil remedies that may be imposed for
breaches of that standard. A single incident of neglect can clearly give rise to
a civil cause of action, whether any disciplinary proceedings are ever under-
taken. Rule 6-102 prohibits a lawyer from attempting to limit his liability to
a client for malpractice. The Rule further provides that a lawyer may settle a
malpractice claim with his client only after advising the client of his right to
consult with another lawyer.
183. See, e.g., In re Becker, 16 I11. 2d 488, 158 N.E.2d 753 (1959) (an alderman should not
appear as counsel before a zoning board of appeal when that board's decision is subject to review
by the legislative body of which the alderman is a member). Cf. Lavin v. Civil Serv. Comm'n,
18 I11. App. 3d 982, 310 N.E.2d 858 (1st Dist. 1974) (assistant attorney general acting as counsel
for labor department should not become witness for department without withdrawing from
case). See also Becker, Ethics in Public Life-A Challenge to the Lawyer, 2 DEPAUL L. REV. 194
(1953).
184. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 6-101. See DeGraw v. State Sec. Ins. Co., 40 Ill. App. 3d
26, 39 n.3, 351 N.E.2d 302, 313 n.3 (1st Dist. 1976) (counsel threatened with contempt for
failure to file briefs timely); Gray v. Cray, 6 Ill. App. 2d 571, 128 N.E.2d 602 (1st Dist. 1955)
(approval of rule requiring lawyers to enlarge their organization in proportion to their increase
in business).
185. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 6-101 (Committee Commentary).
186. See, e.g., In re Taylor, 66 Ill. 2d 567, 363 N.E.2d 845 (1977) (pattern of neglect); In re
Grubbs, 396 Mich. 275, 240 N.W.2d 233 (1976) (single instance of neglect).
187. ILL. CODE, supra note 1, Rule 6-101 (Committee Commentary).
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CONCLUSION
The adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility has filled a signifi-
cant void in Illinois' disciplinary enforcement system. The issues addressed
by the Code cut across all areas of practice and affect relationships with
clients, other lawyers, tribunals and the general public. The range of poten-
tial ethical problems faced by lawyers is correspondingly broad. Familiarity
with the rules of conduct does not guarantee sensitivity to ethical issues.
Nevertheless, working knowledge of the rules is a necessary starting point. As
the Commission drafting the proposed new ABA Rules of Professional Con-
duct has observed:
The Rules . . . presuppose a larger legal context shaping the lawyer's
role. That context includes court rules and other laws regulating the
profession (such as admission to practice), laws defining specific obliga-
tions of lawyers (such as the attorney-client privilege), and substantive and
procedural law in general. Compliance with the Rules, as with all law in
an open society, depends primarily upon understanding and voluntary
compliance, secondarily upon reinforcement by peer and public opinion
and finally, when necessary, upon enforcement through disciplinary pro-
ceedings. The Rules do not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical
considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human
activity can be completely defined by legal rules. The Rules simply pro-
vide a legal structure for the ethical practice of law.18
With the adoption of the Illinois Code, the Supreme Court has provided
Illinois attorneys with a definitive and officially sanctioned framework for
responsible practice. Understanding and complying with these rules should
be an important goal of members and prospective members of the bar.
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